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Abstract
In this thesis we study the problem of requiring self-interested agents need to interact
with some centralized mechanism where this interaction is costly. To improve their util-
ity, agents may choose to interact with neighbours in order to coordinate their actions,
potentially resulting in savings with respect to total interaction costs for all involved.
We highlight the issues that arise in such a setting for the mechanism as well as for the
agents.
We use a mechanism-design approach to study this problem and present a model for
self-interested agents to form groups with neighbours in order to reduce the total inter-
action cost. Our model focuses on two aspects: reward-distribution and cost-sharing.
We look at two scenarios for reward-distribution mechanisms and proposed a core-stable
payoff as well as a fair payoff mechanism. We then propose a cost-sharing mechanism
that agents can use to coordinate and reduce their interaction costs. We prove this mech-
anism to be incentive-compatible, cost-recovery and fair. We also discuss how agents
might form groups in order to save on cost. We study how our final outcome (the total
percentage of savings as a group) depends on the agents’ interaction topology and an-
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Increasing attention has been given to multiagent systems where there are resource con-
straints, e.g., when communicating, agents must consume only limited communication
bandwidth, or pay a certain amount of accessing fee. A lot of work has been done with
respect to teamwork under limited resources [22]. In these settings, agents can benefit
by coordinating with each other, possibly forming groups in order to save on the total
communication cost incurred. In these situations agents are cooperative. However, in
reality, often the agents we interested in are self-interested, meaning they will only act
in their own self-interest, and are not concerned with the overall benefit of the society
or the benefit of other agents. In this situation, agents might have diverging incentives.
On one hand, agents may benefit from co-operating and coordinating in order to save on
interaction costs. On the other hand, agents might not want to reveal the information that
would allow for effective coordination in the first place. We are interested in determining
how to design protocols so that agents will coordinate their actions when that is the best
thing to do, given their own private costs and preferences.
1
1.1 Motivating Examples
There are many real world problems which can benefit from the ideas presented in this
thesis. To illustrate, let us consider the following examples.
In the first scenario we have a network consisting of self-interested agents, each of
whom is capable of monitoring local properties of the network. A centralized network
operator wants to gain an overview of the entire network’s functionality, and thus re-
quests agents to provide their local information. However, agents wish to be rewarded
for the information they provide. Additionally, agents are limited in their communi-
cation capabilities and so incur costs when communicating to the centralized network
operator. However, some agents may reside in the same sub-network (local network) so
the communication between them is virtually minimal. Thus, these agents may benefit
by grouping together and gathering all their information together. Then this group will
choose one agent to send the overall information to the centralized operator in order to
save on the total interaction cost incurred.
In the second scenario there is a retailer auctioning off a set of items. Bidders can
bid on any subset of the items, but are responsible for the shipping costs for any items
they win in the auction. However, the shipping pricing scheme is such that there may
be savings if agents coordinate by transporting a large number of items to one agent’s
location, and then distributing the items among the neighbouring agents. For example,
the auctioneer could be located outside of the country so bidders need to pay a high
international shipping rate for the item. But for those bidders in the same city, they
can make savings by transporting all the items they want to one bidder first, and then
redistribute among the other bidders, which will then only incur a small local shipping
cost.
In the third scenario, we have students studying for an exam. If an individual student
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does not understand some of the course material, then he/she can always visit the profes-
sor’s office hours to get help. However, if the students form a study group, they can share
their knowledge, and only attend office hours when none of them understand something,
thus reducing the amount of time and effort spent at office hours, while improving their
understanding of the material.
While the above scenarios are motivated by very different applications, they can all
fit in our model: one where self-interested agents must interact with some centralized
mechanism, but this interaction is costly. Instead, agents may choose to interact with
neighbours in order to coordinate their actions, potentially resulting in savings with re-
spect to total interaction costs for all involved. At the same time, the center’s mechanism
is trying to obtain some desirable outcome which depends on the agents. For example, in
the network setting the central mechanism wishes to maximize its knowledge about the
network performance, while in the auction setting the auctioneer may wish to maximize
social welfare by finding an efficient allocation. And in the last setting, the professor
wants every student to learn the course material.
1.2 Our Approach
We use a mechanism-design approach to study this problem. In particular, we are in-
terested in understanding under what interaction-conditions should self-interested agents
coordinate their actions so as to reduce their overall interaction costs, and what sort of
coordination mechanisms should be used. We introduce a model that consists of a cen-
ter, a set of agents, an interaction cost from an agent to the center and an inter-agent
interaction cost. We then study our model from three perspectives, the mechanism de-
sign techniques, the grouping strategies and the cost-sharing algorithms. For mechanism
design techniques, we choose to study two different applications separately. The two ap-
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plications we choose are the auction application and the information provision network
application. These two are quite different and are both very popular subjects that have
been extensively studied. Thus studying the two applications will cover a majority of
scenarios that our model fits. The next aspect we study is the grouping strategy. We pro-
pose a group-formation technique for agents to form appropriate groups in order to make
savings. Some major properties we desire are stability and individual rationality. We
also analyze our grouping strategy with respect to different interaction topologies. The
last part of our model is the cost-sharing protocol. We provide an incentive compatible
cost-sharing scheme for the agents in the group to share the interaction cost. The cost-
sharing protocol handles how the total cost is divided among group members. We would
like the protocol to guarantee truthfulness and also fairness, which we will elaborate in
Chapters Four and Five. We argue that this group formation and cost sharing approach
does not affect the center’s goals.
1.3 Contributions
The key contributions for this thesis are as follows:
A Model of Costly Interaction: We present a model for self-interested agents to form
groups with neighbours in order to reduce total interaction cost.
Core-stable and Fair Payoff Algorithms for Reward-Distribution: We propose two
reward-distribution mechanisms that feature core-stability and fairness. We prove
that it is not possible to guarantee the existence of both properties together.
Cost-Sharing Protocol: We propose a novel cost-sharing protocol that is incentive com-
patible, cost-recovery and fair.
4
Analysis on Different Interaction Topologies: We observe that our total percentage of
cost savings for the society depends on the agents’ interaction topology and ana-
lyze different topologies.
1.4 Guide to the Thesis
In this section we outline the chapters for the rest of the thesis:
Chapter 2 - Background: In this chapter we provide the background information for
cost-sharing, game theory and mechanism design used for this thesis.
Chapter 3 - Problem Description: In this chapter we describe our model in detail. We
discuss two sample scenarios. We point out issues that arise in these settings with
respect to the mechanisms and the agents and how we propose to overcome them.
We introduce the main issues and components of our model.
Chapter 4 - Mechanism Design Aspects: In this chapter we describe the mechanism
design techniques used in our model. In particular, we carry out the analysis under
two different scenarios, the combinatorial auction scenario and the information-
provision scenario. We propose different solutions under the two scenarios. For
the information-provision network we use a regular VCG mechanism with reward-
distribution. For the combinatorial auction scenario we look at the problem from a
coalitional games perspective and propose two payoff strategies, with one being in
the core and the other being fair. We also carry out experiments to test the effects
of both strategies.
Chapter 5 - Cost-Sharing Mechanism and Grouping Strategy: In this chapter we present
our novel cost-sharing protocol and the grouping strategy used in our model. We
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show that the cost-sharing protocol has all the properties necessary to support our
model. We develop two sets of grouping strategies and compare the outcomes as
well as the effect on different interaction topologies. We also include experiments
for testing total cost-savings using different grouping strategies on various topolo-
gies in this chapter.
Chapter 6 - Related Research: In this chapter we discuss other work that has been
done in this area and highlight the similarities and differences with our work.
Chapter 7 - Conclusion: In this chapter we conclude our work with a review of our




In this chapter we provide an overview of relevant game theory, mechanism design and
coalitional games concepts that we use in this thesis. For a more complete overview on
game theory and mechanism design, we direct the reader to Mas-Colell et al. [17]. For a
more complete overview on coalitional games, please refer to Kahan and Rapoport [10].
2.1 Game Theory
Game theory is a branch of applied mathematics. It provides a mathematical frame-
work for studying and predicting how agents will interact with each other in the decision
making process.
A game consists of a set of agents, N, (|N | = n), a set of actions, Ai, for each agent
i ∈ N , and a set of outcomes, O. The key concept in game theory is a strategy.
Definition 1 (Strategy) A strategy for agent i, denoted by si, is a contingency plan that
specifies the action an agent should take at every point in the game when it has to take
an action.
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Strategies can be either pure or mixed. Pure strategies are deterministic plans. A
mixed strategy, si ∈ 4(Si) is a probability distribution over the set of all pure strate-
gies, Si, of agent i. We use the notation s = (si, s−i) to denote the strategy profile
where the strategy of agent i is si and s−i = (s1, .., si−1, si+1, ..., sn). A strategy profile,
s = (s1, . . . , sn), is a vector specifying one strategy for each agent in the game. Each
agent i tries to play a strategy to achieve its preferred outcome. We assume that agents’
preferences are expressed in terms of utility functions.
Definition 2 (Utility Function) The utility function of agent i, ui(·), is a mapping from
outcomes to the real numbers;
ui : (O) 7→ R
An agent prefers outcome o1 to o2 if ui(o1) > ui(o2). For simplicity, when it is clear
from the context, we use ui(si, s−i) to denote ui(o(si, s−i)).
A key goal of game theory is to find the stable solution in the space of strategy
profiles. These stable solution are the equilibria of the game. The most well known
equilibrium concept is the Nash equilibria. A Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile in
which each agent is playing its optimal strategy, given the strategies the other agents are
playing.
Definition 3 (Nash Equilibrium) A strategy profile s∗ = (s∗1, . . . , s∗n) is a Nash equi-
librium if no agent has incentive to deviate from its strategy, given that the other agents
do not deviate. Formally,
∀i, ui(s∗i , s∗−i) ≥ ui(s′i, s∗−i)∀s′i.
Although the Nash Equilibrium is a fundamental concept in game theory, it does
have several weaknesses. First of all, there can be multiple Nash equilibria existing in
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one game: thus, agents may not know which one to play. Also, the Nash equilibrium
assumes agents have perfect information about all agents in the game. This is often not
true.
A stronger solution concept is called the dominant strategy equilibrium. A strategy
is dominant if it is the agent’s best strategy against any strategy that other agents may
choose.
Definition 4 (Dominant Strategy) The strategy of agent i, s∗i , is dominant if
ui(s
∗
i , s−i) ≥ ui(s′i, s−i),∀s−i,∀s′i 6= s∗i .
A dominant strategy equilibrium is an equilibrium in which every agent has a dom-
inant strategy. The dominant strategy equilibrium is a robust solution concept since it
makes no assumptions about the information that agents have available to them. It also
does not depend on other agents being rational since an agent’s dominant strategy stays
the same independent of how other agents act. Unfortunately, however, many games do
not have dominant strategy equilibria.
2.2 Mechanism Design
Mechanism design is a subfield of game theory and is sometimes called reverse game
theory. Given a group of rational agents, mechanism design studies how to design rules
of a game for the agents so to achieve a specific outcome. It has been applied in a lot of
areas including auctions and electronic markets [16, 25, 30].
We assume that there is a set of agents, N , |N | = n. Each agent, i, has a type,
θi ∈ Θi, which represents the private information of the agent that is relevant to the
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agent’s decision making. This may include the agent’s payoff function, its beliefs about
other agents, its beliefs about other agents’ beliefs about it, and so on. In particular,
an agent’s type determines its preferences over different outcomes. We use the notation
ui(o, θi) to denote the utility of agent i with type θi for outcome o ∈ O (O is the space of
possible outcomes). The goal of mechanism design is to implement some system-wide
solution, captured by a social-choice function f(·) which is a function of the agents’
types. The mechanism design problem is to implement a set of “rules” so that the solution
to the social choice function is implemented despite agents’ acting in their own self-
interest.
Definition 5 (Social Choice Function) A social choice function is a function f : Θ1 ×
. . . × Θn :7→ O, that, for each possible profile of agents’ types, θ = (θ1, . . . , θn), it
assigns an outcome f(θ) ∈ O.
Definition 6 (Mechanism) A mechanism M = (S1, . . . , Sn, g(·)) defines the set of
strategies Si available to each agent and an outcome rule g : S1 × . . . × Sn :7→ O,
such that g(s) is the outcome implemented by the mechanism for strategy profile s =
(s1, . . . , sn).
A mechanism implements a social choice function f(·) if there is an equilibrium of
the game using the mechanism which results in the same outcomes as f(·) for every
profile of types, θ.
Definition 7 (Implementation) A mechanism M = (S1, . . . , Sn, g(·)) implements so-
cial choice function f(·) if there is an equilibrium strategy profile s∗ = (s∗1, . . . , s∗n) such
that g(s∗(θ)) = f(θ) for all θ.
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While the space of possible mechanisms for implementing a particular social choice
function can be very large, we can restrict ourselves to direct mechanisms which are
those mechanisms where agents’ strategies can consist only of announcing a type.
Definition 8 (Direct Mechanism) A direct mechanism is a mechanism in which Si = θi
and g(θ) = f(θ) for all θ.
We will be particularly interested in an important class of direct mechanisms, namely the
incentive-compatible direct mechanisms, which are those mechanisms where agents are
best off truthfully revealing their type.
Definition 9 (Incentive Compatible) A social choice function is incentive compatible
if the direct revelation mechanism M = (Θ1, . . . , Θn, f(·)) has an equilibrium (s∗1, . . . , s∗n),
where s∗i (θi) = θi for all θi ∈ Θi and for all i.
If the equilibrium is a dominant-strategy equilibrium, then we say that the social
choice function is strategy-proof.
Another important mechanism property is individual rationality.
Definition 10 (Individual rationality) A mechanism is individual-rational if for all types
θi, it implements a social choice function f(θ) such that
ui(f(θi, θ−i)) ≥ ui(θi)
where ui(θi) is the utility the agent could get when not participating.
In mechanism design problems, agents usually have the freedom to choose whether
they wish to participate in the mechanism. If the utility that they can achieve by not
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participating is greater than what they can obtain through the mechanism, then the mech-
anism is not individually rational. Sometimes individual rationality is called voluntary
participation. To further extend this notion, there is also group rationality.
Definition 11 (Group Rationality) For a group of N players, let v(N) be the amount
they jointly receive from a mechanism and u(i) be the utility they receive individually,




An even stronger notion, which requires the above to be true for any subset of a
group, is then called coalitional rationality. It means no combination of agents should
receive a better utility than what they can collectively obtain by forming a coalition.
While mechanisms can be implemented across a wide spectrum of environments, in
this paper we restrict ourselves to settings where agents are risk neutral and have quasi-
linear preferences.
Definition 12 (Quasi-linear Preferences) A quasi-linear utility function for agent i with
type θi is of the form:
ui(o, θi) = vi(x, θi) + ti
where outcome o defines a choice x ∈ K from a discrete choice set K and a transfer
ti by the agent.
The notation vi(x, θi) represents the valuation function of agent i, that is, the value the
agent places on x ∈ K. Mechanisms for quasi-linear settings specify both the choice
x(θ) which affects the agents’ valuation functions, along with the transfer functions ti
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for each agent. The transfer function is the payment either made to the agent or collected
from the agent. It can be either positive or negative.
In quasi-linear settings, we are often interested in whether or not a mechanism is
social-welfare maximizing (or efficient). We say that a mechanism is maximizing social-
welfare if it selects an outcome o = (x, t1, . . . , tn) such that
∑
i vi(x, θi) is maximized.
Definition 13 (Efficient) A social choice function f(x(θ); t(θ)) is efficient if for all







′, θi)∀x′ ∈ K.
A second property of interest in quasi-linear settings is budget-balance. A mecha-
nism is (strongly) budget-balanced if
∑n
i=0 ti = 0. If a social choice function is budget-
balanced then the system does not collect any payment or no net payment is taken out of
the system.
Definition 14 (Budget balanced) A social choice function f(θ) = (x(θ); t(θ)) is budget-




An important family of quasi-linear, incentive-compatible, social-welfare maximiz-
ing mechanisms are the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms.1 In fact, the VCG
mechanism is the only class of incentive-compatible and efficient mechanisms. In a VCG
mechanism each agent reports a type θ̂i to the mechanism. This type is not required to
1VCG mechanisms are not necessarily budget-balanced.
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be its true type. Given the reported types, the mechanism produces an allocation k∗(θ̂)
which is efficient. That is











where hi : Θ−i 7→ R is an arbitrary function which does not depend on the declared type
















i+1, . . . , k
′
n) is the allocation that maximizes the sum of all
agents’ valuations assuming that agent i did not participate. In the rest of this paper when
we refer to a VCG mechanism we mean the pivotal mechanism.
2.2.1 Auctions
An important class of mechanisms are auctions, which are well studied examples of
resource-allocation mechanisms. If an auctioneer wants to sell an item to the agent
with the highest value for the item, it could run a Vickrey auction (also known as the
second-price-sealed-bid auction). The Vickrey auction, which is an example of a VCG
mechanism, works in the following way. Bidders are asked to submit bids to the auction-
eer privately. The auctioneer sells the item to the highest bidder, who pays an amount
equal to the second highest bid. We know that in a VCG mechanism, the payment is
14








j ). In an auction scenario, vj(k
′
j), the valuation




j ) equals zero. Thus the Vickrey auction follows the payment scheme of a
VCG mechanism and is then incentive compatible since no agent has incentive to submit
a bid not equal to its true valuation. It is also efficient since the agent who valued the
item the most receives the item.
The Vickrey auction is an example where only one type of item is on sale. There are
other auction types where bidder can bid for multiple items as a bundle. This is known
as a combinatorial auction. Combinatorial auctions are auctions in which multiple goods
are sold simultaneously. In a combinatorial auction, bidders are allowed to place bids on
arbitrary combinations of these goods.
Definition 15 (Combinatorial auction) A combinatorial auction problem is a tuple,
(N, X, v1, ..., vn), where N is a set of n agents, X is a set of m goods, and for each
agent i ∈ N, vi : 2X → R is a valuation function. Most commonly, the combinatorial
auction problem is to select an allocation a : 2X → N of goods to agents that maximizes
some measure such as total revenue to the auctioneer, or efficiency.
First let us consider a naive implementation of combinatorial auction where the auc-
tioneer simply calculates the valuation that maximizes the social welfare and charges
winners their bid.
Example 1 (Naive Combinatorial Auction) Let there be three agents A,B, C and two
items g1, g2 to bid o. Agents can bid on either a single item or on the bundle {g1, g2}. An
agent’s bid is represented by a tuple: (a bid for {g1}, a bid for {g2}, a bid for {g1, g2}
where the bids are XOR’ed together). Suppose the agents bid as follows:
• Agent A’s bid: (0,0,100)
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• Agent B’s bid: (75,0,0)
• Agent C’s bid: (0,45,0)
Given the bids submitted, the auctioneer will calculate the winner to be bidder B
and bidder C and bidder B pays 75 while bidder C pays 45. However, if the auctioneer
simply calculates the payment by the winner’s bid, agent C would benefit by declaring
its valuation of item g2 to be 26 instead of 45, so that together agent B and C still win but
agent C will pay a much lower cost.
To solve this problem, we use a VCG mechanism (also referred to as the GVA - Gen-
eralized Vickrey Auction), a direct generalization of the second price sealed bid auction
to the combinatorial case, to solve a combinatorial auction. Using the VCG mechanism,
the winners are determined by the bids that maximize social welfare. The cost is deter-
mined by the social welfare if the winner is not present in the auction minus the social
welfare for the rest of agents except the winner. To illustrate, let us consider the following
example.
Example 2 (GVA Example) We now provide an example to see how the Auction works.
Let there be two agents, agent A and agent B, and let there be two items, g1 and g2. Agents
can bid on either item or on the bundle {g1, g2}. An agent’s bid is represented by a tuple:
(a bid for {g1}, a bid for {g2}, a bid for {g1, g2} where the bids are XOR’ed together).
Suppose the agents bid as follows
• Agent A’s bid: (20,5,25)
• Agent B’s bid: (10,15,30)
The auctioneer allocates g1 to agent A and g2 to agent B since this allocation maximizes
the sum of the agents’ valuations. The amount that each agent pays is computed as
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follows. If agent A did not bid, then {g1, g2} would have been allocated to agent B whose
valuation for this bundle is 30. When g1 is allocated to agent A, agent B’s valuation is
only 15 since it receives g2. Therefore, agent A’s payment is calculated as 30− 15 = 15
and its utility is 20 − 15 = 5. Agent B’s payment is 25 − 20 = 5 and its utility is
15− 5 = 10.
2.3 Coalitional Games
An important set of concepts used in this paper are coalition formation and coalitional
games. In particular, we study one application of our model from a coalition-formation
perspective. We analyze core-stability in the mechanism of our model. We are interested
in determining under what conditions can we achieve core-stability using our mechanism
design approach. We chose to analyze this concept because of the nice properties it has.
Thus here we provide some basic concepts that will be used later on.
Given a set of agents, a coalition game is defined simply by how well each set of
agents (or coalition) can do for itself.
Definition 16 (Coalitional Game) A coalitional game (with transferrable payoffs) is a
pair (N, v) where
• N = 1, ..., n is a set of players
• v : 2N → R is the characteristic function, attaching a real-valued value to each
coalition
Usually, the assumption of super-additivity is made:
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• If S ∩ T = ∅ then v(S ⋃ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T ). This means in particular that the
value of the entire set of players (the grand coalition) is no less than the value of
any other coalition.
Finally, for convenience, we normalize the value of the empty coalition to be zero.
Example 3 (Coalitional Game Example) Let us consider a game with three players.
Three players bargain in pairs to form a deal. The deal is simply to determine how much
to reward to the pair of players depending on which pair concludes the deal. If players
A and player B form a pair, then they split 5.00. If players A and C form a pair, then
they split 3.00 and if players B, C form a pair, they split 6.00. Any player alone cannot
win the game and the three cannot be paired all-together.
The game described is a 3-person coalitional game. The characteristic functions for
this game are defined as follows:
v(A) = v(B) = v(C) = v(ABC) = 0, v(AB) = 5.00, v(AC) = 3.00, v(BC) = 6.00
If player A and B chose to pair up and split their shares equally, the outcome for this
coalitional game is:
(2.50, 2.50, 0.00; AB, C)
Given the definition of a coalitional game, analyzing coalitional games amounts to
deciding how v(N) should be divided among the agents. In particular, we are interested
in what payoff vectors should be used.
Definition 17 (Payoff Vector) A payoff vector for a coalition game (N, v) is a vector
(x1, ..., xn) such that xi ≥ 0 and
∑n
i=1 xi = v(N).
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Coalitional game theory tries to understand the repercussions of using different pay-
off vectors. Properties that are looked for are stability and fairness. Two commonly used
solution concepts are the core and Shapley value.
Definition 18 (The Core) The core of a coalitional game consists of all the payoff vec-
tors such that for all subsets S ⊂ N it is the case that ∑i∈S xi ≥ v(S).
In words, the core consists of the set of solutions that satisfy individual, group and
coalitional rationality. If a payoff vector is in the core, then under no circumstances will
any agent want to deviate from this solution and form or join a different coalition.
For example, consider the Treasure of Sierra Madre game [28].
Example 4 (Treasure of Sierra Madre game) In the Treasure of Sierra Madre game,
a set N of gold prospectors find a treasure of many (more than 2|M |) gold pieces in
the mountains. Each piece can be carried by two people but not by a single person. The
situation can be modeled by a game (N, v), where v(S) = x |S|
2
y. In this game, if |N | ≥ 4






). This is because if every
two persons can carry a piece of gold, then each of them receives 1
2
as the payoff. But if
|N | ≥ 3 and is odd, then the core is empty. This is because, since every piece of gold has
to be carried by two persons, the payoff for everyone who carries a piece of gold is 1
2
as
in the previous case. However, since |N | is odd, there is always going to be one person
who cannot carry anything and has a payoff of zero. Thus for any subset S (with size s is








And the valuation of the subset is:






i∈S xi < v(S),which contradicts the definition of core.
From the Treasure of Sierra Madre game, we can see that there are only two possible





). On the other hand, when |N | ≥ 3 and is odd, the core is always empty.
There can also be cases where the core is not empty, but is not unique either, as illustrated
in the next example:
Example 5 (3-Person Game) Consider a 3-person game, let there be three agents A,B
and C and define
v(AB) = 90, v(AC) = 80, v(BC) = 70, v(N) = 135.
Let the payoff vector be (xA, xB, xC), we need to solve for:
xA + xB ≥ 90
xB + xC ≥ 70
xA + xC ≥ 80
and we know xA + xB + xC = 135. Consider solution sets (65, 55, 15) and (65, 25, 45),
we can see both of these solutions satisfy our equations. Thus both of the solutions are
in the core, which means the core in this game does exist, but is not unique.
From the above examples, we can see that the core can be empty or nonempty. When
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it is nonempty, it can be either unique or not. When the core does exist, it gives us
stability. When the core is nonempty, the cooperative demands of every coalition can be
granted, thus there is no need for a social mechanism for resolving conflicts and setting
priorities. In other words when a core is nonempty, the whole system is stable, since no
one would have a desire to leave. Having said that, the existence of empty cores does
limit its usefulness. Thus people sometimes use other solution concepts for coalitional
games. An important one of them is, the Shapley value.







|S|!(|N | − |S| − 1)![v(S
⋃
i)− v(S)]
In words, this can be viewed as capturing the average marginal contribution of an
agent. For a player i, the Shapley Value ρi(v) gives the payoff of each agent. It is a
summation over all the subsets of the coalition S where i is a member, with a numerical
coefficient multiplying the difference between the value of any subset S and the value of
that coalition without i. It equals the weighted sum of the incremental additions made by
the player to all coalitions that it is a member of. It thus reflects a player’s marginal con-
tribution in a coalition. The Shapley value is interesting because it always exists. It also
captures a notion of fairness. The fairness here means that it gives more payoff to agents
with a greater contribution. However, this fairness comes with a price of weakening the
stability condition as we have guaranteed when the core exists. Furthermore, there is no




In this chapter we provide a detailed description of the problem we study in this thesis,
namely how agents should organize in order to reduce interaction costs. We start by
giving two motivating examples which illustrate the types of problems we are interested
in. We then define our model of the problem, and discuss the issues which we address
later on in this thesis.
3.1 Motivating Examples
In this section we provide two motivating examples that we use throughout the thesis.
The first example is from an e-commerce domain, whereas the second example is drawn
from a network monitoring application. While these two domains initially appear to be
quite different, we will show, in the next section, that they have more similarities than
differences.
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Figure 3.1: A real-world auction setting example
3.1.1 A Combinatorial Auction Problem
In Figure 3.1, an auctioneer is auctioning bundles of items to bidders. However, the
problem is that the auctioneer is located quite far (e.g. in another country) from the
bidders and a bidder, if it wins an item in the auction, has to pay the shipping cost.
However, if agents in the same geographic location (i.e. the same city) coordinate and
cooperate, they could submit a joint bid for all items the group is interested in, ship all
items to a single location, and then deliver them locally. If they shared the shipping costs,
it might be possible to reduce the costs of all agents in the group.
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3.1.2 Information Provision Network Example
In the second example, we have a network consisting of self-interested agents, each of
whom is capable of monitoring local properties of the network. A centralized network
operator wants to gain an overview of the entire network’s functionality, and thus requests
the agents to provide their local information. However, the agents wish to be rewarded
for the information they provide. Additionally, agents are limited in their communication
capabilities and so incur costs when communicating to the centralized network operator.
For example, there might be a one-time fee charged to contact the network operator, or
there might be limited bandwidth so that agents need to pay a per-unit charge to transfer
the information. However, some agents may reside in the same sub-network (local net-
work) so the communication between them is minimal. Thus, these agents may benefit
by grouping together and gathering all their information together. By grouping together
they first choose a communicator (possibly the agent with lowest interaction cost to the
network operator) and transfer all information to this communicator. Then the commu-
nicator sends the group information up to the network operator, pays the interaction cost
and receives a reward. The reward and cost are then shared among group members using
some pre-determined protocol independent of the network operator’s knowledge. From
the network operator’s point of view, it treats a group the same as an individual agent.
3.2 The Model
At first glance, the two problems presented in the previous section are quite different.
However, after a closer look, we can see there are many similarities between the two.
In both applications self-interested agents need to interact with some centralized entity





















Figure 3.2: An example problem configuration. It costs agent 1 C1 to communi-
cate to the center. Agent 1 is also able to interact with its neighbour, agent 2, at
a cost of IC1,2.
both cases, by interacting with the central entity, the agents try to obtain some benefit.
However, agents incur a cost (e.g. shipping cost, limited bandwidth). Thus, essentially,
both applications need to solve the problem where self-interested agents need to interact
with some central entity in exchange for some reward, and want to share and minimize
the cost incurred during the interaction.
We present a general model for these problems. First, in our model there is a central
entity, denoted by E. This center handles the overall reward/payment distribution. In
terms of the combinatorial auction example [Example 3.1.1], the auctioneer is the cen-
ter. The auctioneer has to determine who wins which items and report the shipping cost
to each agent. In terms of the information provision example [Example 3.1.2], the cen-
tralized network operator is the central entity who collects information from the agents
and rewards them for their efforts.
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Second, in our model there are interaction costs from agents to the central entity. We
denote this cost by Ci. We assume that this cost is only known to the agent itself and the
central entity since in real life this is often the case. For example in the auction setting
[Example 3.1.1], the interaction cost for an agent is the shipping cost if it wins an item
in the auction.
Third, we assume that agents can interact with their neighbours. We denote an inter-
agent interaction cost between agents i and j as ICi,j . This is the cost of agents i and
j interacting. We refer to this cost as the inter-agent interaction cost. In the auction
example [Example 3.1.1], this is the local shipping cost between bidders who reside
in the same city. In the information-provision network example [Example 3.1.2], this
is the communication cost between agents who reside in the same local network. The
interaction cost between two agents is known publicly to both agents.
Lastly, we need a set of n self-interested agents, with quasi-linear utility function.
An example of this interaction model is shown in Figure 3.2. Agent 2 can interact
with the central mechanism at a cost of C2. It can also directly interact with its neigh-
bours 1 and 3 at a cost of IC1,2 and IC2,3 respectively. Without loss of generality we
assume that inter-agent interaction costs are symmetric. This is merely to simplify nota-
tion, and does not affect our general results. We also assume that agents’ interaction costs
are additive. That is, for example, if agent 2 wishes to interact with agent 5, then the cost
to agent 2 is IC2,3 + IC3,5. Note that it is possible for an agent to be unable to interact
with any other agents. We are particularly interested in settings where ICi,j << Ci. This
is a reasonable assumption, for example, in the combinatorial auction scenario, the in-
ternational shipping rate is usually much more expensive (easily exceed a hundred times
more for heavy items) than the local shipping rate. We need this assumption because
otherwise agents will not benefit by forming groups.
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We assume that agents derive some value from the interaction with the central mech-
anism. For example, if we are in an auction environment, the interaction result would be
an allocation of items to the agent along with a price that the agent must pay for those
items. In a network information-provision setting, an agent’s value from an interaction
is the amount it is paid to provide the information minus the cost it incurred from having
to collect the information in the first place. We denote the utility derived by agent i from
interacting with the central mechanism by
uinti = vi(o, θi) + ti
where ti is the transfer of money that is either made by the agent (i.e. the money agents
pay for the item in the auction setting) or is made to the agent (i.e. the reward agents get
in the information provision setting), o is the outcome of the interaction, θi is the type of
the agent, and vi(o, θi) is its valuation for the result of the interaction.1
3.3 Issues
We are interested in settings where the central mechanism is trying to ensure that agents
truthfully reveal their types, while maximizing social welfare. In a standard setting, the
central mechanism could simply run a VCG mechanism, and every self-interested agent
would be best off interacting with the mechanism by truthfully revealing its type. The





1The vi(o, θi) for the auction setting would be the value that the agent places on getting the items it is
allocated. The vi(o, θi) in the information provision setting would be the cost to the agent of collecting
information to the center.
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where Ci is the cost to agent i of the interaction. Agents wish to increase uinti while
decreasing Ci. In particular, we are interested in situations where there are savings to be
had if groups of agents coordinate their interactions and share the cost. For example, in
Figure 3.2 if C3 is much less than C2 and C5 then agents 2 and 5 might want to coordinate
with agent 3 and form a group. The three agents would then negotiate how to share the
cost and reward amongst themselves. If an agreement is reached, a group will be formed
and agent 3 will then represent the group to collect and send all the information to the
central entity. Once a group has been formed, it is acting as a single unit. In other words,
from the central entity’s perspective, it treats each group as a whole and is not responsible
for what happens within a group. A goal of this thesis is to understand how and when
agents will coordinate their interactions and what are the aspects that will affect agents’
decisions.
In the rest of this chapter, we describe some of the issues and challenges related to
this model.
3.3.1 Two Levels of Mechanisms
The first issue we need to solve is how to encourage the self-interested agents to truth-
fully reveal their information/valuation to the mechanism. Our overall mechanism needs
to be strategy-proof so that overall, our agents will not lie about their valuations or infor-
mation. In addition, the model requires two levels of mechanisms. Inside each group, a
mechanism has to exist to handle the reward-sharing for group members. As an exam-
ple, in Figure 3.2, assuming a combinatorial auction scenario, agents 4, 5 and 6 may be
able to form a group. If they decided to form a group, then a mechanism needs to be
introduced so that each agent in the group will report its valuation truthfully to it. Then
this mechanism will send the group valuation to the central entity. At the center’s level, a
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central mechanism needs to exist to handle the reward-distribution amongst groups. Here
the central entity runs a centralized mechanism to calculate which group gets what items
and the payment to collect from the group. This centralized mechanism also needs to be
incentive compatible so that the mechanism inside each group will not lie about the total
group valuation. When rewards are assigned back to each group, the mechanism inside
the group needs to determine the shares that each agent would get. A simple solution to
guarantee truthfulness is to use the VCG mechanism at both levels, since the VCG mech-
anism is strategy-proof. However, this solution has some weaknesses. In particular, in
this hierarchical approach, it is no longer guaranteed to maximize social welfare if agents
are viewed as separate entities, though it is still guaranteed to maximize social welfare if
groups are viewed as individual entities. This will be discussed further in Chapter Four.
3.3.2 Cost-Sharing Protocols
One of the motivations of this work is that agents will coordinate in order to share in-
teraction costs. Thus we need to develop protocols that allow agents to share the costs.
Since in our model, the interaction cost from the agent to the center is private, known
only to the agent itself, we need a cost-sharing protocol that is incentive compatible so
that agents will not benefit by lying to the mechanisms about their costs. While many
cost-sharing algorithms have been studied previously [20, 19], a common assumption
in these protocols is that the total cost is known in advance or can not be manipulated
directly by the agents. Since in our model, an agent is chosen by the cost-sharing pro-
tocol to interact with the center, costs can be manipulated by the agents. We argue that
our cost-sharing algorithm needs to be able to achieve this. Simple ideas such as divid-
ing the shares equally amongst group members will not have this property. Lastly, the
mechanism should not collect an excess amount. We want the protocol to collect exactly
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Line Topology Star Topology Tree Topology
Figure 3.3: An example of three basic interaction topolgoies: Line, Star and Tree
enough to cover the actual interaction cost because we do not want excess money being
collected by the mechanism. Therefore, we require a protocol that ensures that all agents
are honest about their (potential) costs, and that shares the costs appropriately amongst
the agents. We propose desired properties for a cost-sharing mechanism and introduce
one that satisfies our required properties in Chapter Five.
3.3.3 Interaction Topology
Another important feature we study in our mechanism is the interaction topology of the
agents. The interaction topology is a graph where each node represents an agent, and
edges between nodes indicate that two agents can interact with each other. We borrow
this concept from the concept of network topology, the study of arrangement or mappings
of elements in a network. Figure 3.3 shows an example of three major topologies. In
other words, the interaction topology in this paper describes the layout and neighbour
information of the agents. The weight of edge (i, j) is ICi,j or the inter-agent interaction
cost. The central entity in our model is not shown in these topologies, and each agent
is able to communicate to the central entity alone. Figure 3.4 is an example of the line
topology. As we can see, in this example, all agents are able to communicate to the center







Figure 3.4: An example with line topology
cost between agents in the topology is IC1,2 and IC2,3.
In this thesis we will study how different interaction topologies affect the group for-
mation process as well as the cost-saving in our model in Chapter Five.
3.3.4 Group Formation
The last aspect of our model is the grouping strategy agents follow. We need to determine
how groups will be formed by agents. In particular, there are two requirements for our
grouping strategy. First, we want individual rationality, i.e. we want a strategy that only
forms groups when all the agents are better off (or at least not worse off) than if they
acted alone. Second, we want our grouping strategy to satisfy, at a minimum, a weak
stability condition so that agents, once inside a group, do not want to deviate and act
on their own. We also analyze if and how grouping strategies are affected by different
interaction topologies in Chapter Five.
3.4 Summary
In this chapter, we provided a detailed description of the problem we are studying. We
first gave two motivating examples to illustrate the type of problems we are interested
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in. We then provided a detailed description of the problem, namely how agents should
organize in order to reduce interaction costs. Finally, we presented our model, discussed




This chapter discusses the mechanisms we use to handle reward-distribution among
groups and between group members. The role of a reward-distribution algorithm is to
allow agents to achieve their original goal while forming groups. For example, in an
combinatorial auction setting, agents’ goal is to win the item, and they will still want
to achieve this while forming groups and save cost at the same time. This concept is
thus separated from our cost-sharing and group formation concept and assumes groups
have already been formed. As mentioned earlier, there are two levels of mechanisms to
consider. The first level is at the center’s level, and the second is at the group’s level. Our
general proposal is that the center simply runs a VCG at the top level to ensure truthful
reporting of the valuations. We assume that each group, once formed, submits a single
group type represented by a group valuation function, vg, to the central mechanism. For
example, in the combinatorial auction example, the group type would be the total items
that each agent in the group wants, and in the information-provision example, it will be
the valuation of the overall information of agents in the group. The central mechanism
uses this information to determine the outcome. In the simplest scenario we assume
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that the central mechanism simply runs a VCG mechanism based on the vg’s it receives.
That is, it chooses the outcome o∗ = arg max
∑
g vg(o) and calculates transfers for each
group tg = h−g(v−g)−
∑
i6=g vi(o). In the combinatorial auction, this will be a negative
amount representing the money group pays to get the items, in the information provision
setting this will be the amount of communication cost for the group to communicate to
the centralized network operator. In order for the groups to determine what vg is and how
to share the transfers, we make each group run a VCG mechanism among its members.





Proposition 1 Under the center’s VCG scheme, once a group G has formed a group
valuation vG, it is best off truthfully revealing it to the center and every agent in the
group will truthfully reveal its valuation to the group.
Proof:
Let us assume that agent i in the group declares its valuation to the group mechanism
be v̂i, different from its true valuation vi. There are two cases. First, an agent will not
declare a cost v̂i < vi simply because it will have less chances of winning and will not
be better off. Now what happens if it declares v̂i > vi? Since the center is running a
VCG mechanism, as a group, the group will submit a truthful group valuation, if some
agent declares a higher valuation, there must be some other agent who has to declare
a lower valuation to make the group valuation unchanged. However, no agent will be
willing to declare a valuation lower than its own. Given this situation, if agent i declares
v̂i > vi, the the group valuation will be greater than its true valuation. Since agent i
knows the center is running a VCG mechanism and as a group, they need to submit the
true valuation, it will not declare its valuation to be higher. Thus agent i will report its
true cost to the group. ¤
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Unfortunately, this approach no longer guarantees that the final allocation among the
agents themselves, when viewed from a global perspective, will be efficient.
Example 6 (Inefficiency Example) Assume there are three agents {A,B, C} and three
items {a, b, c} for sale. Assume that agent A wants item a and is willing to pay up to $3
for it, agent B wants item b and is willing to pay $2 for it, and that agent C wants bundle
{b, c} and is willing to pay up to $4 for it. If each agent interacted with the central entity
independently, then the social welfare maximizing allocation would be for agent A to get
item a and for agent C to get bundle {b, c}. However, if agents A and B formed a group
and acted as a single agent, then their bid to the central entity would be $5 for bundle
{a, b}, thus the final allocation would be that the group of agents A and B would get
{a, b} which they would allocate between themselves. This does not lead to a socially
optimal outcome.
The above example shows possible issues of inefficiency using our proposed mech-
anism. We are interested in developing methods to overcome this. However, we do not
believe that a single approach will work for all applications. As a result, we classify
this problem based on the valuation functions of the agents. Specifically, we study two
scenarios. In the first scenario, items that agents want (or will be getting rewarded for)
are substitutes. That is, an agent does not care which item it gets (or is rewarded for),
as long as it gets one of them (The items are interchangeable). For example, if an agent
wants one item from a set of N items, it does not care which of the N items it gets, as
long as it gets one of them. In the second scenario, items are not substitutes. That is, if
an agent wants item x with a certain valuation, then it will not be happy if we give it item
y instead of x.
We choose two applications that represent each scenario to study the inefficiency
problem. For the first scenario, we choose the information-provision network applica-
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Figure 4.1: Example of the discretized areas
tion. In an information-provision network setting, agents want to be rewarded for pro-
viding the information to the centralized network operator. They do not care about which
part of information the center rewards them for, as long as they get a reward. In the sec-
ond scenario, we choose the combinatorial auction application, since in a combinatorial
auction, bidders are only happy if they get the items they want. For example, if a bidder
has a valuation on a TV set, it does not tell us if he likes a computer or how much he
would like to pay for it. Furthermore, he will not be happy if we give him a computer
instead of a TV set. Although we are studying the inefficiency problem on an application-
specific basis, our results can be transferred to other domains. We are confident that by
looking at these two different cases, we cover a wide range of applications.
4.1 Information-Provision Setting
Recall the information provision setting we introduced in the beginning of the thesis.
In this setting, we make an assumption about the information structure of the agents. In
particular, we assumed that information can be discretized into areas and an agent’s value
of a set of information areas is evenly distributed, and an agent’s value of the information
areas is additive. As an example, let us look at Figure 4.1. In this figure agent A covers
areas 7, 8, 11, 12. If the overall valuation for agent A over the four areas is Vtotal, then




This assumption allows us to handle information overlap in a consistent and precise
manner. The center still runs a VCG mechanism with each agent’s type being the infor-
mation it preserves and the value being the valuation of the information. The idea is that,
if the bids of groups can be split so that the central mechanism can pin-point which part
of the bid is causing conflicts with other bids, then we can reach better solutions.
Assume that two groups submit bids on bundles which overlap with each other. The
central mechanism allocates the items using a standard VCG mechanism, but indicates
which items caused a conflict between the bundles. The central mechanism can redis-
tribute some of the money it collects back to all groups, to encourage everyone to par-
ticipate. In particular, we can use a redistribution scheme as introduced by Cavallo [4]
and Bailey [3], which has been proven to be incentive-compatible. Although this scheme
does not necessarily affect agents’ decision on whether to join the group or not, it does
lead to better efficiency.
Definition 20 (Redistribution Scheme) Assume I agents, a1, .., ai have overlapping
bids and the value of their overlapping items are V1, .., Vi respectively, with V1 > V2 >
· · · > Vi. If i = 2, then let V3 = V2 − β, β > 0.(We chose β > 0 to control how much we
want to redistribute in the setting where only two agents overlap). Let Zi be the payment












Since in this scenario the center’s best interest is to collect maximum information.
However, when an overlap occurs, it will collect an extra amount of money which it has
no interest to keep. The above scheme thus allows the center to distribute part of this
amount back to the agents.
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Now let us summarize the overall mechanism design approach used by the center
and the mechanism inside each group for this example. After each group is formed,
a group-mechanism is assigned and is in charge of the payment and cost distribution
amongst group members. Here we focus on reward distribution (cost-sharing is discussed
in Chapter Five). After forming groups, the group-mechanism runs a standard VCG
inside the group. It keeps a record of the bidding order and collects the sum of the
winning bid as the groups submit bids to the center. The center then runs a VCG on these
group bids. If no overlap occurs, the case is very simple and no extra step is needed.
Complications arise when there is an overlap of information. There can be two types
of overlaps: at the group level or inside individual groups. When overlap occurs inside
groups, the central mechanism does not need to be aware of it. The group-mechanism
will take care of the overlap by using the redistribution algorithm to compensate the
losing agents inside each group. When overlap occurs at the group level, the center
will use the redistribution method and send back the information about which agent’s
bid caused the overlap. Then for the losing groups, the group-mechanism can use this
information to charge the appropriate amount for the overlapping agent. In other words,
the non-overlapping agents will not pay extra because of the existence of the overlapping
agent. Let us use a concrete example to illustrate.
Example 7 (Payment-Redistribution with discretization) Assume that all the infor-
mation can be divided into 9 areas, 1, . . . , 9. Let there be three agents A, B and C with A
and B in the same group G. Let agent A cover the information areas 1, 2, 3 and agent B
cover 4 and 5. Let agent C cover the areas 5 and 8 Assume the three agents’ value of the
information is 6, 6 and 6 respectively. First, group G runs its internal VCG mechanism
and obtains: tA = tB = 6 − 6 = 0, vg = 6 + 6 = 12. The group then sends along its










Figure 4.2: Example for reward-distribution in Information Provision Setting
Next, the center runs VCG with group G and agent C. Now we see there is an overlap
of area 5. Since in the information provision setting we assume agents’ value are evenly
distributed, the center can run VCG on areas except the overlapping one first. That




= 3 There are no overlaps here so the payment sent back to the two will be 9.6
and 3 respectively. Now the center runs VCG on area 5, since vG = 12 − 9.6 = 2.4
and vC = 3, agent C will win and must pay 2.4. Agent C will also get back from the
center a value of 3. Now using redistribution, each agent will get back from the center
2.4−0.5
2
= 1.05. Thus the total payment agent C gets : 3+3−2.4+1.05 = 4.65 The total
payment group G gets is : 9.6 + 1.05 = 10.65.
Now inside group G, the group-mechanism knows it is agent B who has the overlap-
ping information, so agent A should get back 6 dollars and agent B will get 10.65− 6 =
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4.65.
4.2 Combinatorial Auction Setting
The inefficiency issue we illustrated in the example at the start of the chapter not only
shows possible inefficient outcomes, but also brings a factor of instability and unfairness
in the combinatorial settings. To try solving these problems, we look at the combinato-
rial setting in a different way. First of all, we modify the bidding language and let the
valuation sent to the center from the group be a permutation of XORs of all the possible
bids. For example, if there are two agents (A,B) in the group and agent A wants item {x}
and agent B wants item {y}, then the group will send out the bids {x} XOR {y} XOR
{x, y}, with the value of the combined bid simply being the summation of valuations of
each individual bid. We try to analyze this setting from a coalitional game prospective.
4.2.1 Coalitional Games
As introduced in Chapter Two, there are different solution concepts for a coalitional
game. The two most common ones are the core and the Shapley value.
The core is a well-known solution concept in coalitional games. Of all the theories
to be considered, the core is the simplest to define and perhaps the most intuitively sat-
isfying. If we can show that our payoff vector is in the core, it means the cooperative
demands of every coalition can be granted, and coalitional, group and individual ratio-
nality are all satisfied. It gives us a stable solution. However, one disadvantage of the
core is that it does not necessarily exist. Therefore, people often rely on some other so-
lution concepts such as the Shapley value. The Shapley value has some nice properties.
In particular, it always exists and it captures some degree of fairness (i.e. the payment
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of each agent is proportional to its marginal contribution in the group), moreover, its
fairness comes with a price of sacrificing stability. We discuss the notion of fairness in
detail in the next section. A solution using Shapley value is not necessarily in the core.
Moreover, calculating Shapley value is very expensive. The core can be calculated in
polynomial time, but the Shapley value can only be calculated in quasi-polynomial time.
Thus, in our solution, we decide to focus on the core concept.
4.2.2 Core Stability
First, let there be N agents in the group, (a1, ..., an). Let the final allocation be A: thus if
ai ∈ A then agent ai is in the final allocation. The final allocation represents a mapping
with the winning agents in the group and the payment the agents make for the items. Let
v(i), i ∈ N be the valuation of the bundle to each agent. we define the valuation of the





where PG equals to the total payment for the items the group has to submit to the cen-
ter (i.e. the payment each agent pays for the item) and
∑
i∈A v(i) represents the sum
of total valuations for the winning agents. This value is obtained by the group mech-
anism running a VCG mechanism. For simplicity of notation, let us define
∑
i∈A v(i)
as V(A). If an agent is not in the final allocation, then the total payment it pays should
equal to zero. Then V (G) represents the earnings in the group and this amount should
be distributed across the agents. We then define a payoff vector x1, ..., xn such that
∑
i∈N xi = V (G), xi ≥ 0. The payoff vector represents the amount of earning that each
agent gets back (mathematically, it equals the valuation of the items of the agent minus
the payment it makes for them).
Given the above definitions, the following property holds:
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0 i * A
V (G) ∗ v(i)V(A) i ∈ A
(4.2)
for every subset S ⊂ G.
And each agent’s payment for its bid is then:
v(i)− xi
Proof: First of all, we declare that if an agent is not in an allocation, then the payoff
vector for it should be 0 and it will not make any payment either. We claim this is stable
for the agent because if it does not get the final allocation, it means that even if it goes
alone or joins another group, it will still not get the final allocation. However, by staying
in the group it does make a saving on the total interaction cost incurred. Thus when an
agent is not in the allocation, we claim the payoff of this agent is 0. And we then only
need to look at the cases where an agent is part of the allocation.
By definition, to show that our payoff vector is in the core, we need to show that for
every subset S ⊂ G,
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ V (S)











And we also have the constraint that
∑
i∈N xi = V (G), xi ≥ 0.
Substituting the xi’s and expanding the left hand side of the equation, we get:
∑
i∈S







And since if an agent is not in the allocation, it is not making any payments, then
∑
i∈S PG ∗ v(i)V(A) =
∑




i∈S∩A v(i). This means
the left hand side of our equation equals to the right hand side, and by definition, the
payoff vector that gives us this solution is in the core.
Next we need to show that our claimed solution is the only solution under this cir-
cumstance.
To prove the uniqueness of our allocation vector, let us assume there exists some
allocation vector which is not the same as the one given in the core above. Let us call
this other solution y = (y1, ..., yn). Since this solution is also in the core, the following
equations are satisfied:
∑
yi = V (G)
By definition, this means:
y1 ≥ v1 − PG v1V(A) = x1












since x 6= y, then it must be the case that ∃ya > va − PG vaV(A) . Thus we have:
∑
i∈N



































V(A) = V (G)
Now we have showed that
∑
i∈N yi > V (G) which leads to a contradiction of the defi-
nition of the core. Thus the allocation vector we proved is the only vector that is in the
core. ¤
The proof shows that we are able to get a core-stability solution. However, this
particular solution is not fair. We discuss this in the next section.
4.2.3 Fairness
The word fairness means free from dishonesty, bias or injustice. In mechanism design,
this term is used in a lot of models and the meaning of them are usually different. In our
model, we use the notion of coalition fairness as defined below.
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Definition 21 (Coalition Fairness) Let P (ai) denote the payment of agent i if we use a
standard VCG mechanism and every agent is going alone, and let vi denote the valuation
of agent i. We then say a payoff vector (x1, .., xn) of a coalition G in our model is fair if,
given the final allocation and the bid of the second highest price:
• vi − xi ≤ P (ai)
• If P (ai) = 0, then there exist ` > 0 such that the payment of the agent is vi−xi−`.
In words, the above definition means:
• If an agent should win irrespective of whether it is in the group or going alone, he
should pay at most the amount as though it is going alone.
• If an agent could have won with a price of zero by going alone, he should be
compensated by the group in which it belongs.
To illustrate, let us consider an example to see why the core-stable payoff vector does
not guarantee fairness.
Example 8 (Core-stable but not Fair payoff) Let there be four agents A, B, C, D. where
agents A, B and C form a group and agent D is in a group alone. Let agents A, B, C want
items x, y, z with prices 4, 4, 2 respectively and agent D would like item x, z with a price
of 5. From the VCG mechanism, we know the group will win items x, y, z with a price of
5.
Now, from the coalitional games, we have the value of the group as following:
V (G) = 4 + 4 + 2− 5 = 5
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And all the possible subsets:




∗ 5 = 4




∗ 5 = 3




∗ 5 = 3
If we want allocation vector (xA, xB, xC) to be in the core, we need:
• xA + xB + xC = 5
• xA + xB > 4
• xA + xC > 3
• xB + xC > 3
Solving the above inequalities will give us the unique solution: (2, 2, 1). The payment
each agent will need to submit is then (4− 2, 4− 2, 2− 1) = (2, 2, 1).
However, let us we look at agent B in the group. If this agent was not inside any
group and were to submit the bid to the center on his own, it would still win the item y,
but with a price of 0! This is because no one else is competing on this item with him, and
by the definition of a VCG mechanism, the payment it has to pay equals zero. Thus, by
being in the group, it is particularly unfair for this agent since now it has to pay a price
of 2 dollars!
In order to get fairness into our model, we need to modify our value function for the
subsets as follows:
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Let B denote the set of items in the second highest price bid. For each subset S ⊂ G,





0 S ∩B 6= ∅& ∑i∈S∩A v(i) < PG∑
i∈S∩A v(i)− PG S ∩B 6= ∅&
∑
i∈S∩A v(i) > PG∑
i∈S∩A v(i)− 0 S ∩B = ∅
(4.3)
In words, it means that the value for the subset is equal to the sum of the valuations for the
agents in the set, minus the price that the group should pay if this subset was competing
with and winning over the second highest price bid. If the subset could not win over the
winning bid then the value of the subset is zero. If on the other hand, the subset does not
contain common items from the second highest price bid, the value of the subset equals
to the sum of the valuations of the members.
Let us see how this second definition brings us fairness:
Example 9 (Fair payoff Example) Consider the same setting as the previous example,
we still have the same V (G) = 5 and the constraint xA + xB + xC = 5. However, the
valuations for the subsets now become:
V (A,B) = 4 + 4− 5 = 3
V (A,C) = 4 + 2− 5 = 1
V (B, C) = 4 + 2− 5 = 1
Thus, we need:
• xA + xB + xC = 5
• xA + xB > 3
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• xA + xC > 1
• xB + xC > 1
There are multiple allocations in the case, one possible allocation is then (1, 3, 1), which
gives each agent’s payment as (4 − 1, 4 − 3, 4 − 1) = (3, 1, 3). As we can see, this
solution is fair since agent A and C are not paying more than they should have when
they’re going alone and agent B gets compensated by being in the group. However, as
we can see, there are multiple solutions to this question: the core is not unique.
4.2.4 An Impossibility Result
Unfortunately, the solution above, although it solved the fairness issue, will not guarantee
the existence of a core.
Example 10 (Fair payoff with empty-core example) Let there be four agents A,B,C,D
with agents A,B and C in the same group. Let agents A,B,C,D want items x, y, z, y
with valuations 4, 2, 1, 4 respectively. In this example, agents A,B will win items x, y
with a price of 6. From the fair payoff algorithm, we can calculate V (G) = 4+2+1−4 =
3 and the constraint xA + xB + xC = 2. And the valuation of the subsets are:
V (A,B) = 4 + 2− 4 = 2
V (A,C) = 4 + 2− 0 = 6
V (B, C) = 0
Thus, we need:
• xA + xB + xC = 3
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• xA + xB ≥ 2
• xA + xC ≥ 6
• xB + xC ≥ 0
However, since xA + xB + xC = 3, xA + xC ≥ 6 is not possible! Thus in this scenario,
a core-stable solution does not exist.
Proposition 3 It is not possible to guarantee both fairness and stability for reward-
distribution in our coalitions.
Proof: As we have shown, the core-stable payoff algorithm always gives us an unique
payoff vector that is in the core, but it is not fair. On the other hand, there is no guarantee
that the fairness payoff algorithm always has a core-stable solution. Thus it is impossible
to guarantee both fairness and stability in our model. ¤
Now we have shown that our first set of solutions is in the core, but not fair, while our
second set of solutions is fair, but a core does not necessarily exist. It is intuitive to ask
which solution should we use? We think the answer is application-dependent. A lot of
time, stability has to be sacrificed to get fairness. For example, the very popular solution
concept, Shapley Value, provides fairness at a price of decreasing stability. In a setting
where self-interested agents may have access to more information, the fair algorithm
should be preferred. For example, if agents in our setting are able to talk to agents in
other groups, then they may deviate if we are using the core-stable solution because it is
not fair to them. To better understand the difference between these two payoff algorithms,
we carry out experiments in the next section.
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4.3 Experiments
In order to understand the effects on agents when using a stable protocol compared to a
fair protocol, we carry out a series of experiments. We first would like to see the effect
on each agent’s payment with no grouping compared to the two algorithms (Core-stable
v.s. Fairness). Then we would also like to see the differences in each agent’s payment
using the two algorithms.
4.3.1 Setup
For simplicity, we fix our settings to test a very simple scenario. We have five agents and
four items to choose from. Each agent randomly picks one out of the four items. Since
there are five agents and four items, this makes an overlap very likely to occur. Each agent
has a value for the item, drawn uniformly from the interval [1,10]. We then divided the
agents into two groups (a group of three and a group of two) and then ran the regular
VCG mechanism, the core-stability algorithm and the fair algorithm respectively. Each
experiment is carried out 10000 times. We ignored the cases when the fairness payoff
algorithm cannot generate a core-stable solution and only looked at the cases where both
algorithms had a core-stable solution.
4.3.2 Results
No Grouping v.s. Core-stable Grouping
The first set of experiments compares the total payment of each agent with no grouping
(the regular VCG with 5 agents) and core-stable grouping where we divide the payment
by fraction among the winning group members.
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Figure 4.3: Payment comparison for each individual agent using original VCG
and our core-stable mechanism
Figure 4.3 suggests that the core-stable grouping method is beneficial only for certain
agents, but not every agent. This is expected because forming coalitions changed the
final outcome and as discussed before, sometimes by doing this an agent has to pay more
than what it would have paid originally. However, if we calculate the total payment the
agents had to make for the two methods, they are roughly the same. This means that the
algorithm redistributes some of the payments among agents but does not add to the total
payment. The total payment that the center collects is the same.
Core-stable Grouping v.s. Fair Grouping
Next we look at the comparison of the core-stable payoff method and the fair payoff
method. Of the 10000 runs, we specifically look for an agent who would have paid 0 if
it had participated in a standard VCG mechanism, then collected the data on these runs
and looked at the payment for each agent. Of the 10000 runs, there are 1652 cases where
the agent we picked (Agent 2) falls in this category.
We can see from Figure 4.4, as expected, the total payment agent 2 made in the fair
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Figure 4.4: Payment comparison for each individual agent using the core-stable
and fair mechanisms
scheme is less than in the stable scheme. If we take a closer look, we can see that the total
payment still equals roughly the same for the two algorithms. So again, our algorithm
mainly redistributes the payment among the agents. From the center’s point of view, it
collects the same amount no matter which algorithm the agents follow. This is a nice
property because we do not want the center to be able to take advantage of the strategies
that agents follow.
So far we have experimented using different payoff solutions. It is clear that no matter
which payoff we choose, the total amount of payment does not change since the payoff
method does not change the final allocation. It is also clear that some agents benefit from
the solution while some agents have to pay more. Unfortunately, it is unclear to us at this
point as in which agents benefit more from which solution. Clearly, each approach has
its own advantages and disadvantages. Thus we think the answer is application depen-
dent. The system designer should decide which property (stability or fairness) is more
important in the specific application.
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Table 4.1: Highlights of Two Scenarios
Application: Information Provision Network Combinatorial Auction
Valuation Function: Substitutes Non-substitutes
Group Level Payment: VCG + Redistribution VCG + XOR group bids
In-Group Payment: VCG + Redistribution Core-Stable or Fair Payoff
4.4 Summary
In this chapter, we provided a detailed discussion on the mechanisms used for reward-
distribution. We looked at two applications. We made an assumption in the information-
provision network that information could be discretized into areas and an agent’s value
of a set of information areas is evenly distributed. Given this assumption, we could apply
the VCG mechanism on the areas with or without overlap separately. For the areas with
overlap, we then proposed a redistribution algorithm to redistribute some of the extra
transfer that the center collects. We then looked at the problem from a coalitional games
perspective for the combinatorial auction setting. We proposed a reward-redistribution
method that is core-stable. We showed that this core-stable method is not fair and pro-
posed a fair solution. However, the fair solution is not necessarily stable. We then car-
ried out experiments to look at the payment redistribution of each individual agent in the
group using different redistribution schemes.
In summary, Table 4.1 highlights the key properties of the two scenarios and our
model can be applied to any application that fits into the generalization of either scenario.
The valuation function in the table is the key difference of the two scenarios. It is the
underlying valuation function of the agents that determines which scenario an application
fits in. For example, if we have an auction scenario where there is just one type of item
and an agent’s utility is associated with the number of items it gets but not which item
it gets ( i.e. items are substitutes), then this setting would fit into the generalization of
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’information provision network’ scenario even though it is an ’auction’. The group level
payment entry lists how payment is redistributed at group level and the in-group payment
entry lists how payment is redistributed inside groups. When there is a none-substitutes
valuation function, there is not a generic answer as to which in-group payment approach
to take (core-stable or fair). We think it is up to the system designer to decide which




In this chapter we introduce our cost-sharing protocol and group-formation algorithms.
The cost-sharing protocol is held by a trusted third party to whom each agent can reveal
its cost. Once a group has been formed, our cost-sharing protocol picks the agent to
interact with the center and handles the cost-distribution among group members. Our
grouping strategy, on the other hand, allows agents to form groups in the first place. We
discuss and prove the properties of these protocols and discuss our findings from series
of experiments.
5.1 The Model
As we recall, our model consists of the following parts:
• A central entity, denoted E
• A set of n self-interested agents, with quasi-linear utility functions
• Interaction cost from agent i to the central entity, denoted as Ci
55
• Interaction cost between agents i, j (inter-agent interaction cost), denoted as ICi,j
Our goal is to design a protocol that is truthful, individually rational and allows agents
to reduce interaction costs by forming groups. In this chapter, we will focus on the last
part. Namely, we study how agents can share the interaction cost in order to reduce
their costs overall. The rest of the chapter consists of three sections. In the first section
we present our cost-sharing protocol and in the second section we discuss the group-
formation algorithms. In the last section we discuss our experiments and analyze the
results.
5.2 Cost-sharing Protocol
One intuitive question to ask is: Why do we need a cost-sharing protocol? Recall the
combinatorial auction example in Chapter Three. Agents located in the same geographic
area form groups in order to save on the total interaction cost. In our model, agents
have a common goal: save cost. Forming groups and sharing total cost allows them to
do this. Once they form a group, they must cover the total cost spent as a group, and
thus must decide how to divide and share this cost. Since our agents are self-interested
utility-maximizers, a simple cost-sharing protocol is not trivial. Thus we need to develop
protocols that allow agents to share the costs and not at the expense of others in the
system.
5.2.1 Goals
There are several features of our problem setting which make cost-sharing an interesting
and challenging problem. First, the agents are self-interested and so will take actions
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which will benefit themselves, possibly at the expense of others in the system. Second,
there are hard constraints faced by the agents. In particular, if the group incurs a cost,
then the resources to pay for the cost must come from the group. Finally, we would like
a cost-sharing protocol to be fair, in that the amount that agents contribute to the group
somehow reflect the benefit the agents are receiving from the group. In the rest of this
section we provide more details about these desired properties.
Since the agents are self-interested, the appropriate incentives must exist so that they
will participate in a cost-sharing protocol. Agents need incentives to participate in the
first place. This means that the cost they must pay by participating in the protocol must
not be higher than the cost they would pay by acting alone. Let Ci be agent i’s cost to
interact to the center alone and let Ci denote agent i’s cost inside a group. The constraint
we need is Ci < Ci. We call this the participation constraint or the individual rationality
constraint.
The next goal is to achieve truthfulness. This property, although not considered in a
lot of popular cost-sharing schemes, is very important to us. The reason is in our setting,
the interaction cost to the center is an unknown variable and since our agents are self-
interested, it is possible and likely that agents will manipulate this cost in order to make
a profit. To prevent this situation from happening, we need a cost-sharing algorithm that
is truthful, i.e., agents cannot manipulate the interaction cost by themselves and benefit.
Definition 22 (Truthfulness) Let Ci denote the actual interaction cost to the center for
agent i and let C ′i be agent i’s reported cost (C
′
i 6= Ci). Let Ci denote agent i’s share in
the group if it declared its cost truthfully and let C ′i denote agent i’s share in the group
if it declares its cost to be C ′i. We say a cost-sharing algorithm is truthful (incentive
compatible) if an agent will not pay a smaller share of the total cost (and as a result,
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increase its own utility) by lying:
C ′i ≥ Ci (5.1)
The next property we desire is what we call cost recovery. This is desirable since we
have to collect enough money to cover the cost of the group, but on the other hand we do
not want extra money floating around, decreasing overall social welfare.
Definition 23 (Cost-Recovery) A protocol is a cost-recovery protocol if the amount it
collects from the agents is exactly the amount needed to cover the costs. Let C be the
total interaction costs of the group, including the cost incurred from interacting with the
central entity. Let Ci be the amount agent i is charged by the cost-sharing protocol. Then
if
∑ Ci = C, the protocol is a cost-recovering protocol.
The final property we desire is fairness, which we define in terms of the benefit a
particular agent receives by being in a group. Let Ci, i ∈ N be the interaction cost from
agent i to the central mechanism. Let Ci, i ∈ N denote the share of cost each agent pays
inside the group. We denote the benefit of an agent as Bi = αCi, α > 0, i.e. the benefit
an agent receives is proportional to its interaction cost to the center. After a group is
formed, the interaction agent is chosen to be the one with lowest interaction cost to the
center and this cost will be shared among the group members. As we recall, we assume
that the interaction cost between agents is much smaller comparing to the interaction cost
for an agent to communicate to the center thus we neglect it here. As a result, agents with
higher interaction cost originally make more savings than agents with lower interaction
cost. This is why our benefit depends on the original interaction cost of an agent, and the
higher the original cost is, the larger the benefit is.
Definition 24 (Fairness) We say a cost-sharing algorithm is fair to an agent i if, for all
agent j 6= i:
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If Bj > Bi, then Cj ≥ Ci
In words, this means that if an agent obtains a higher benefit, it cannot pay less than
an agent with a lower benefit. We describe this property last because while it is de-
sirable, without it, we will still have enough nice properties for our models, since the
cost-recovery and truthfulness properties alone can result in an interesting cost-sharing
protocol. Thus, we will try to achieve fairness, but not at the expense of the other prop-
erties. We think that in real-world scenarios, fairness can actually enhance stability. For
example, if an agent with a very low benefit observes that some other agent in another
group with similar benefit is paying a much smaller amount, or some agent in its group
with a much higher benefit is paying a similar share, it will give the agent incentive to
leave the group. In our model, we use the agent with the lowest interaction cost to the
center as the communicating agent. Thus we want to give this agent a degree of fairness
so that he will not have incentive to leave the group.
5.2.2 Existing cost-sharing protocols
Cost sharing has been a topic of interest across many areas. Moulin et al. has proposed
cost-sharing algorithms in economics [19, 21]. Roughgarden et al. has looked at the
problem in the networks [5, 1]. There have been many proposals for cost-sharing proto-
cols. In this section we describe the two standard ones. One of the simplest cost-sharing
protocol is derived from the Shapley value, and is sometimes called equal charge cost-
sharing [10]. This rule states that given some fixed cost C, every agent pays an equal
share (i.e. C
n
if there are n agents). While this protocol clearly satisfies our cost-recovery
property, it is far from our definition of fairness.
Example 11 (Shapley value cost-sharing) Let us refer back to our information provi-
sion scenario. Suppose there are three agents (A,B,C) who can talk to each other. Let
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us assume the agents can talk to the center with a one time fixed-cost of 6, 10, 50 respec-
tively. For simplicity, let us omit the inter-agent interaction cost here. Suppose the three
agents decide to group together and send all the information through agent A, with a
cost of 6. Now if the agents use a Shapley value cost-sharing algorithm, then each agent
will pay 6
3
= 2. Clearly, agent C is making a much bigger benefit than the rest of the
agents and thus this algorithm is not fair.
Another standard cost-sharing protocol is the Moulin-Shenker serial cost-sharing al-
gorithm [21]. In this protocol, a fixed group of agents share one input, and one output
technology with decreasing returns. For example, a group of people all want to buy cher-
ries through some vendor located far away. They then have to share the cost of shipping
cherries. However, they have decreasing returns as in that although they want cherries,
as they get more, they are not as happy as before because if they cannot finish them, the
fruit will go bad. Each agent announces its demand qi of output. The cost function is
denoted by C so the system must share a total cost of C(
∑
i qi) among the n agents. The
cost-sharing formula goes as follows: Agent 1 with the lowest demand q1 pays 1n th cost
of nq1. Agent 2, with second lowest demand q2 pays agent 1’s cost share plus 1n−1 th of
the incremental cost from nq1 to (n− 1)q2 + q1. Similarly, agent 3 pays agent 2’s share
plus 1
n−2 th of the incremental cost from (n− 1)q2 + q1 to (n− 2)q3 + q2 + q1. Thus the
cost share depends anonymously upon demands and an agent’s cost share is independent
of demands higher than its own. Formally, let ξi(C, q) denote the cost for agent i with
cost function C and demand q, then:
ξi(C, q) =
C(qi)




(n− k + 1)(n− k)
Example 12 (Moulin-Shenker Example) Let us go back to the cherry example. As-
sume the cost function for shipping cherry is one for one up to ten pounds of goods and
60
ten for one afterwards, i.e.:
C(q) = q, q ≤ 10
C(q) = 10q − 90, q > 10
Let there be three agents with demand q1 = 3, q2 = 6, q3 = 10, respectively. Thus, from




∗ nq1) = C(1
3
∗ 3 ∗ 3) = C(3) = 3
Agent 2 would pay agent 1’s cost, plus 1
n−1 th of the incremental cost from nq1 to (n −
1)q2 + q1, which equals:
3+
1
3− 1 ∗ (C((3−1)∗6+3)−C(3∗3)) = 3+
1
2
∗ (C(15)−C(9)) = 3+25.5 = 28.5
Similarly, we can get agent 3’s share of cost, which equals to the remaining balance,
68.5.
The Moulin-Shenker protocol recovers cost since the sum of all shares is C. It is also
fair according to our definition since agents with higher demand pay more. In addition,
it has several other nice properties. First, it is anonymous (the names of the agents do not
matter). Second, it is monotonic (an agent’s share increases as it demands more output).
Third, it is smooth (an agent’s cost share is a continuously differentiable function of the
vector of demands), and lastly, it is a Nash equilibrium profile (the result of the protocol
gives a unique Nash equilibrium). Finally it has been shown that it is the unique cost-
sharing protocol with these properties. Unfortunately, it is not well suited to our domain.
In its setting, the declared demand qi are assumed to be given and cannot be manipulated
by agents. This is not true in our model since the interaction cost from an agent to the
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center is unknown. If we were to use this scheme, the demand qi would be replaced by
a variation of the interaction cost to center Ci. However, we could not guarantee that
agents report their interaction cost truthfully. If agents were able lie about this cost (e.g,
declaring a lower cost), they could make a profit. Also, we cannot guarantee a convex
cost function, which is critical in the serial cost-sharing protocol. Another point is that
the group is considered fixed in this protocol and the goal is not on saving the total
cost incurred. For example, if we look at the cherry shipping example above, although
the protocol is fair, the most reasonable solution is for each agent to order and ship
alone! Thus, giving the above arguments, we conclude this protocol is not suitable for
our model.
Having said the above, we conclude that none of the existing cost-sharing algorithms
can best reflect our model, thus we propose our own cost-sharing algorithm in the next
section.
5.2.3 Our Cost-Sharing Protocol
In this section we introduce our proposed cost-sharing protocol.
Definition 25 (Cost-Sharing Protocol) Assume each agent i announces that its inter-
action cost with the center is C ′i, assume its interaction cost with the group, g, is IC
g
i
and this is publicly known by group members. Assume C ′1 < C
′










share that each agent has to pay is:










, i = 1
C′1−C1
n−1 , 2 ≤ i ≤ n
In words, the cost-share of each agent can be divided into two parts, the share of cost
to interact with the center (Ci), and the share of cost to interact with each other ( IC
n
).
We declare the share of interaction cost between agents to be divided equally among the
members since each agent is involved and has equal importance in this cost. For the
interaction cost to the center, we declare the interaction agent to pay a lower cost while
all other agents are paying a higher cost. We argue the above cost-sharing algorithm
can easily be used with different cost functions. In this thesis we study two basic cost
functions. First is the fixed cost function, such as a one-time fee charge, or a flat shipping
rate. The other typical cost function we will study is a unit-cost function. In a unit cost
function, the total cost = (per unit cost) x (number of units). Our protocol can be used in
a fixed-cost scheme without any modification. For a unit-cost scheme, let I denote the
total number of units for the group, each agent will pay:
Ci × I + IC
n
In our protocol, the inter-agent interaction cost within a group is equally shared
among the agents. For the interaction cost to the center, the interacting agent is pay-
ing the lowest amount and all the other agents are paying a higher value. To prove this,




And all the other agents are paying:





Comparing these two equations, we have:








(n + 1)C ′1 − C ′1 − (n− 1)C ′1
(n + 1)(n− 1) =
C ′1
(n + 1)(n− 1) > 0
And this shows that every other agent is paying an amount higher than what the agent
with lowest interacting cost pays.
To get a better understanding of the protocol, let us present an example:
Example 13 Let there be three agents (n=3) A, B, C, in a fixed-cost line topology A-B-
C. Let the inter-agent interaction cost between AB and BC equal to one. Let CA = 6,
CB = 3 and CC = 8. Since agent B has the lowest cost to the center, it will become the
agent that interacts with the center. The total inter-agent interaction cost is 2 (1 each for
agents A and C to interact with B). Thus the total cost needs to be spent for the group is
3 + 2 = 5. Now let us calculate each agent’s cost using the above algorithm, if everyone

























= 5 = 3 + 2.
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5.2.4 Properties
In this section we discuss the properties of our protocol.
Proposition 4 The cost-sharing protocol is individually rational if the total interaction
cost for the group IC satisfies IC < min( n
2
n+1
C1, nCi − n2n2−1C1).
Proof: Let IC denote the total inter-agent interaction cost for a group of n agents. Let
the original interaction cost to the center of these agents be C1, ..., Cn, respectively, with
C1 < ... < Cn. To interact as a group, the agents will each pay a share of the inter-agent
interaction cost as well as a share of the cost to interact to center (C1, in this case). To












The first equation needs to hold for agent 1, who is paying the least share, the second






IC < nCi − n
2
n2 − 1C1 (5.5)
In order for the cost-sharing algorithm to be individually rational, both of the equations




and nCi − n2n2−1C1. ¤
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The individual rationality of our cost-sharing protocol does come with a constraint.
However, we assume that the inter-agent interaction cost is much smaller than the cost
to interact to the center alone in most of the cases, since otherwise it does not make










C1 and nCi −
n2
n2−1C1) = 2Ci − 43C1 > 2C1 − 43C1 > 23C1. So in this case, the minimum constraint is
2
3
C1. However, from our assumption, IC is usually much less than this. This shows that
although there is a constraint, most of the time it will be satisfied. Although the individual
rationality for our cost-sharing protocol has a constraint, since our grouping formation
algorithm (which we will talk about in the next section) is individually rational, we still
get our desired outcome in our model.
Proposition 5 The cost-sharing protocol is a cost-recovery protocol.
Proof: From the scheme, we can see that the total cost the agents pay is equal to:
(n− 1)× C1 − C
1




× n = C1 + IC
Thus the mechanism collects C1 + IC, which is exactly what needs to be spent. The
mechanism makes no profit or loss, it covers exactly the amount that needs to be covered.
No agent has paid any extra amount. Thus we say this mechanism is ’cost-recovery’. ¤
Proposition 6 The cost-sharing scheme is incentive-compatible.
Proof: To show that our scheme is incentive-compatible, we need to show that agents
are best off telling the truth about their interaction costs. Let the actual lowest cost be
C ′1. This proof is done in three parts. First of all, we can see that no agent will want to lie
by announcing a cost lower than C ′1. This is because even if an agent lies to have a lower
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cost C ′i < C
′
1, when interacting, he will incur a cost Ci,which is greater than C
′
i. Thus
the difference Ci − C ′i has to be paid by this agent itself and it has to do the extra work.
Next, it is obvious that the cost-sharing scheme only depends on the number of agents
and the agent with lowest cost C ′1. This means for all the other agents, lying by having a
cost C ′i, such that C
′
i 6= Ci and C ′i > C ′1 is not going to make a difference. This shows
for all agents except agent with cost C ′1, lying does not make them a profit.
Now let us look at the agent with the lowest cost, agent 1. We have already showed
that by lying to have a lower cost, it is not going to make a profit. Assume that agent 1
announces a cost Ĉ1 > C2 > C1. Then, its share would be












if it has declared its cost truthfully.










Since C2 is the lowest cost now, C2 equals to the share of the communicating agent,
i.e.C2 = C2
n+1











Further simplification gives us:
C2(n + 1)− C2 ≤ C1(n− 1)
or
n(C2 − C1) + C1 ≤ 0.
This is impossible since C1 ≥ 0 and C2 > C1. Therefore, we have a contradiction, and
so agent 1 is worse off declaring an interaction cost that is greater than C2. Thus now
we have showed that none of the agents will make profit by lying, i.e. the scheme is
incentive-compatible. ¤
Proposition 7 Our cost-share protocol is fair to every agent in the group.
Proof: From the definition of fairness, for a group of n agents, we can write out their
benefits by: Bi = αCi, where α > 0, Ci is the interaction cost for this agent to com-
municate to center, and Ci is the total cost this agent pays inside the group. Since we
assume C1 < C2 < ... < Cn, this means B1 < B2 < ... < Bn. From our cost-
sharing protocol, we know that C1 < C2 = C3 = ... = Cn. This gives us that for every
i, j ∈ (1, ..., n), if Bi < Bj , then Ci ≤ Cj . This satisfies our definition of fairness, and
thus our cost-sharing protocol is fair to everyone.
¤
We designed our protocol to distinguish only the interacting agent and the rest of the
group on purpose. Our reason is that the absence of any other agent will not result in
much difference whereas the absence of the agent with lowest interaction cost may result
in changing the whole structure of the group. Since if the lowest cost agent does not
exist, it may not be beneficial for the agents to be in that group at all! Thus we made sure
68
in our protocol that the agent with lowest cost is indeed paying the smallest share so that
he will not have incentive to leave the group.
5.3 Grouping Strategy
So far in this chapter we have talked about how costs would be shared once a group
has been formed. We have not, however, discussed how the group would be formed in
the first place. In this section we discuss group formation strategies. We first define
some properties we wish our group formation strategy will exhibit. We then propose a
group-formation algorithm that satisfies these properties. We analyze its performance on
different interaction topologies and then propose heuristics that can improve its perfor-
mance.
5.3.1 Properties
We propose a greedy group-formation strategy for agents to use when deciding which
other agents to coordinate with. There are two properties we desire in our strategy. First,
we want a strategy that only forms groups when all the agents are better off (or at least not
worse off) than if they acted alone. That is, we want an individually-rational grouping
strategy. This is essential since our agents are self-interested. Second, we want our
groups to satisfy, at minimum, a weak stability property.
Definition 26 (Locally Stable) A group is locally-stable if no subgroup of agents can
benefit by leaving the group and acting on their own.
Our local-stability property is similar to the notion of group-strategy-proof but is weaker
since we require only that agents are better inside a group compared to acting indepen-
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dently.
Definition 27 (Group-Strategy-proof) A protocol is group-strategy-proof if for any
subset S ⊂ N, u(S) is maximized. That is, no subsets of agents in the group will want to
deviate and form a group on their own.
5.3.2 Grouping Algorithm
Our grouping strategy works as follows. First, each agent creates a list of its neighbours
and the inter-agent interaction costs. Then the algorithm picks an agent randomly and this
agent then scans the list and contacts the neighbours starting with the lowest interaction
cost. If there is a mutual advantage to coordinate, the two agents form a group. Let
Ci, Cj be the interaction cost from agents i, j to the center respectively, and let Ci,Cj be
the interaction cost agent i and j would pay if these two form a group. Then the two
agents will form a group if and only if Ci < Ci and Cj < Cj . That is, they will form a
group if the cost shares for both of them are less than their cost of interacting with the
center alone. After a group is formed, the group’s neighbour agents will automatically
update their neighbour list to include the group. The algorithm then randomly picks
another agent who will do the same. If the group is contacted by another agent i, the
group will let i join only if two conditions are met:
1. The cost shares of the agents do not increase. Agents will not let another agent
enter their group, if the cost increases for all agents. This tends to occur whenever
agent i’s addition to the group would increase the total inter-agent interaction cost,
without decreasing the interaction cost with the mechanism.
2. The internal social welfare in the group does not decrease by the introduction of
the new agent, as calculated by the group mechanism.
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If an agent is rejected by a group, then it must either act on its own or contact another
group or individual agent.
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Here is the pseudo-code for our algorithm:
create agent list with all agents;
while(there exist an agent i inthe agent list) {
if(i has neighbour)
{
Agent* bestChoice = i.neighbours.at(0);














i forms a group on its own




Our proposed grouping strategy has the following properties:
Proposition 8 The grouping strategy is individually rational.
Proof: From the strategy, no agent would join a group which would make it worse
off compared to if it was acting by itself. This means for every agent in the group, it is
getting better utility compared to going alone, thus our grouping strategy is individually
rational. ¤
Proposition 9 The grouping strategy is locally-stable.
Proof: First of all, we already proved the strategy is individually rational, meaning
once in a group, an agent will not want to deviate by leaving the group and acting on its
own. Also, after a group is formed, it will only let new agents join if the social welfare
of the existing members does not decrease. Thus in terms of an individual agent, its own
utility always improves by the introduction of a new agent. This means that once in a
group, an agent will never find itself in a worse situation than when it joined. This results
in the group being locally-stable, since once in a group, an agent is always better off
staying in the group. ¤
5.3.3 Interaction Topology
As mentioned in the previous chapter, one aspect that we are interested in studying is the
interaction topology.
Definition 28 (Interaction Topology) The interaction topology is a graph where each
node represents an agent, and edges between nodes indicate that two agents can interact
with each other.
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Line Topology Star Topology Tree Topology
Figure 5.1: An example of three basic interaction topolgoies: Line, Star and Tree
In particular, we are interested in studying if our grouping strategy is topology inde-
pendent. In other words, is the outcome the same no matter what topologies we use? If
not, then why is it happening and is there a common pattern in terms of the cost savings?
Having these questions in mind, we analyze the savings of the total interaction cost using
our proposed grouping strategy. We start with the three basic topologies; a line topology,
a star topology and a tree topology as shown in Figure 5.1.
Line Topology
The line topology has the simplest structure of the three topologies we study in this sec-
tion. Each agent (except the first/last agent) would have exactly two neighbours that it
can communicate with. Thus essentially, each agent has approximately the same impor-
tance in the topology. Thus we conclude the current group formation strategy in random
order serves the line topology the best and we will focus on improvement with the other
topologies.
Star Topology
In a star topology, only the center agent is able to contact other agents. Thus, if our








Figure 5.2: An example scenario of Tree Topology
the center agent. This will give the center agent limited choices. Thus it will make more
sense if we actually start with the center agent so that this agent will have the full set of
choices. Since the neighbour agents do not really have another option, it is very easy for
them to make decisions. Additionally, since our goal is to maximize social welfare, it
also makes sense to include agents with higher interaction cost to the center in the group
rather than having these agents act by themselves. This means we should give priorities
to agents with higher interaction cost to the center.
Tree Topology
The tree topology has the most complicated structure among the three topologies we
study. Initially, we predict that highest social welfare should be achieved in this topology
amongst the three. To illustrate, let us consider the following example:
In Figure 5.2, we have six agents (Agent A - F ) in the system. Let us suppose that
randomly, we start grouping with agent A. Agent A would go ahead and contact its
neighbours (B and C) and would eventually form a group with agent B and agent C. If
the grouping algorithm stopped here, it would isolate agents D, E and F , forcing them
to act in their own. If on the other hand, we start from the leaf nodes, agent D and E,
then we may end up with only two groups, one for agents A,B, D and another for agents
C,E, F , and as a result, increase the social welfare. This is the aspect that our current
grouping strategy does not take advantage of.
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5.3.4 Heuristics
While our grouping algorithm is very general, by adding heuristics that depend on the
interaction topology, we can improve performance. First of all, we modify the strategy
to have a specific order of communication. We sort the agents from highest interaction
cost to lowest and then start the grouping with the first agent, i.e. the agent with highest
interaction cost. The reason is that by doing so, we make sure that agents with higher
interaction cost are in the group so that we can improve the social welfare. To illustrate,
let us consider the following example:
Example 14 let there be three agents A,B,C and let the interaction from these agents
to the center be 2, 3, 100 respectively. Let ICA,B = 2.5, ICB,C = 2.
First of all, if agents A and B form a group, according to our protocol, agent A’s total
cost is 2
4
+ 1.25 = 1.75. If agent C is added to the group, agent A’s total cost would
become 2
4
+1.5 = 2 > 1.75. Thus by our grouping strategy, agent C will not be added in
the group and will have to act alone. Similarly, if agent A and C grouped together first,
adding agent B will also decrease the current social welfare thus the three agents will
have to be split into two groups.
However, agent C has a very high interaction cost to the center. Thus if agent C is in
the group, we will save a huge amount on the total interaction cost incurred in the system
whereas for agent B, being in the group does not benefit it that much.
From the example, we can see that starting from the agent with highest interaction
cost will improve social welfare. Secondly, we also want to take into consideration the
different topologies in our strategy. Thus we added in another small justification: if the
interaction topology is a star topology, we start grouping from the center agent first, for
the rest of the agents, we start from the agent with highest interaction cost to the center.
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For a tree topology, we start from the leaves. If there is more than one leaf node, we start
with the one with highest interaction cost to the center. Then for the rest of the nodes,
we apply the order from highest interaction cost to the lowest.
Let us give an example on how the improved method is better.
Example 15 (Tree Topology Example) Consider the tree topology in Figure 5.2. Let
the inter-agent interaction cost equal 3 for any two agents. (i.e. ICi,j = 3, for i, j ∈
A, ..., F ). Assume the interaction cost from each agent to the center is as follows: CA =
3, CB = 5, CC = 4, CD = 4, CE = 3, CF = 5. Let us assume that using the first
grouping strategy, agent A goes first.
Using the original grouping strategy, agent A will contact its neighbours B and C
and eventually, the three will form a group and agent A’s total cost equals 2.75. Now





social welfare for the current group is going down thus no more agent will be added
in the group. As we can see, agent D, E, F have to communicate to the center alone




Now let us consider the use of heuristics. In this scenario we start communication
from the leaf nodes. Thus agent D goes first to communicate to the neighbours (Agent
B) and form a group. Agent E then communicates to agent C to form a group. Then
agent F will communicate to join the group with agent E and C. From calculation we can
get that this group cannot accept any more agents. And agent A will end up joining the
same group as agent D. Thus in this scenario, we have two groups in total. And the total
interaction cost saved is 1− 9
24
= 0.625.
As we can see, using the improved grouping strategy, we save an extra 14.5 percent
on the total interaction cost.
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5.4 Experiments
We developed a simulation environment and experimented with our mechanism using
different numbers of agents, interaction topologies, and cost function combinations.
We first report results which show that our group-formation and cost-sharing protocols
greatly reduce the overall interaction cost for agents, but, as expected, is sensitive to the
type of cost function. We then report our findings on the impact that different interac-
tion topologies have, both in terms of interaction-cost savings, as well as on the average
group size formed.
5.4.1 Experimental Setup
Our simulation environment assumes that agents are providing information, and thus the
interaction cost represents the cost of communicating the information. Therefore, we
use the term communication cost when referring to the interaction overhead. We experi-
mented with two different types of cost function. We first used a constant-cost function,
which depended only on the fact that an interaction with the center occurred, and not
on the amount of information sent. We assigned cost functions to agents at random, by
drawing values from the interval [1,100]. The second type of cost function used was
per-unit cost function, which depended on the amount of information transmitted. The
cost of transmitting a single unit of information to the center was drawn uniformly from
[1,10], and the amount of information each agent had to transmit, in terms of units, was
also drawn uniformly from one to ten. For all experiments, we set the inter-agent com-
munication cost to be five, independent of whether the communication cost to the center
was a constant, or a function of the number of units of information sent. We note that
the inter-agent communication cost was set quite high in order to bias the results so that
they were pessimistic in their cost-savings finding. We expect that in many actual ap-
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plications, the inter-agent communication cost would be much lower than the cost of
interacting with the central mechanism.
We studied different interaction topologies in our experiments. We used the simplest
topology, the line topology in the experiments comparing different cost functions. In our
second set of experiments we compared the line, star, and tree topologies when agents
have a fixed communication cost function, as defined above. We ran each experiment
100000 times, and report the average values.
Measurement
We had three goals when running our experiments. We first wanted to measure the cost-
savings agents experienced from using our mechanism. Let Cns denote the total cost
without our grouping strategy and Cs denote the total cost with the grouping strategy.
We calculated a cost-measurement using the following;
Savings = S = 1− Cs
Cns
(5.6)
That is, S × 100 is equal to the percentage savings experienced by the agents. Values of
S closer to 1.0 are better. Our second goal was to gain an understanding of the size of
groups that would form when using our mechanism, and how this was influenced by the
types of cost functions agents had. Finally, we also studied the cost savings as a function





















Average Percentage of Savings using Line Topology with different Cost Functions
fixed-cost
unit-cost
Figure 5.3: Savings using Line Topology, Fixed-cost v.s. Unit-cost
5.4.2 Results
Comparison with different cost functions
Figure 5.3 shows the difference in cost savings between situations where agents had fixed
communication cost functions as opposed to unit-cost communication cost functions. We
set the interaction topology to be a line. The result shows that the savings with fixed-cost
is quite high (up to 80%) and relatively stable as the number of agents increases. Com-
paring the outcomes between the two cost-functions, we see a higher saving is achieved
using the fixed-cost scheme. However, the savings for the unit-cost scheme can still be
maintained at an average of 15%.
Next, Figure 5.4 shows the average number of groups formed under both fixed cost
functions and unit-cost functions. We see that for the same number of agents, the unit-
cost scheme generates a larger number of groups than the fixed-cost scheme. This is to





















Average Number of Groups
fixed-cost
unit-cost
Figure 5.4: Number of Groups, Fixed-cost v.s. Unit-cost
leads to a decrease in the number of groups formed. While a larger group has a larger
inter-agent cost, the cost of interacting with the center is fixed, so each agent has to pay
a smaller share. However, in a unit-cost scheme, as the number of agents increases in the
group, the total number of units also increases, and therefore the total communication
cost increases. Thus under the unit-cost scheme, the total cost will increase rapidly to
the point where introducing a new agent will not benefit existing agents. As a result, the
average group size in a unit-cost scheme is smaller. We also studied the variance in this
setting and our resulting variance is around 0.01. This is a small variance and thus a good
indication that our algorithm does not fluctuate much.
Comparison with different interaction topologies
The next set of experiments compares the result of a fixed communication cost function
on three different topologies – line, star and tree. In a star topology, agents are grouped

























Figure 5.5: Savings using different topologies.
topology is 6. In the tree topology, balanced binary trees are used. Figure 5.5 shows the
average percentage of savings using the three topologies.
First, we observe some interesting patterns in the star topology results. In particular,
we observe a wave pattern of size six. This particular finding is very interesting and it
captures the property of the star topology. Since in our experimental setting each star is
disjoint, the maximum group size is six and each group of six is essentially independent
from the others. Another important property in the star topology is agents have a very
limited number of neighbours. Only one agent is fully connected to other agents. Due to
the fact that our inter-agent communication cost is set to be quite high, this means that as
the number of agents increase, there is a higher chance that the agent will not be accepted
in the group. If an agent is not accepted, it will have to communicate to the center alone
and decrease the total savings in the system. This explains the downward trend inside
each group.
Next we discuss our findings from using a tree topology. The result looks similar to
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the line topology. The average percentage of savings in this topology does not fluctuate
greatly as the number of agents increases. However, we see that the average saving in this
topology is not as great as the line topology, which came as a surprise. Our hypothesis
is that our group mechanism does not fully take advantage of the tree topology, and in
particular, we are observing situations where parents are forming one group, but leaving
all the children isolated, thus increasing the overall communication cost. This raises an
interesting question for future investigation. In particular, we are interested in whether
it is possible to modify the grouping scheme so that it is aware of topological properties

























Comparison with Star Topology
Original Grouping Strategy
Grouping Strategy using Heuristics



























Comparison with Star Topology
Original Grouping Strategy
Grouping Strategy using Heuristics
Figure 5.7: Savings in Tree Topology using different grouping strategies.
Comparison with different grouping strategies
Having done the above, we decide to look at possible improvement using our improved
grouping strategy. In particular, in the next set of experiments, we compare the result us-
ing the original grouping strategy with the improved strategy where we start the grouping
from the agent with highest cost. The setup for this set of experiment is exactly the same
as the previous ones.
We can make several observations from figures 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8. First of all, our
new strategy does improve the overall social welfare. Having said that, the improvement
depends heavily on the type of topology. We see a great amount of improvement in the
star topology. In a star topology, there can only be one group with multiple agents. If
























Comparison with Star Topology
Original Grouping Strategy
Grouping Strategy using Heuristics
Figure 5.8: Savings in Line Topology using different grouping strategies.
with higher interaction costs are inside the group and thus saves more globally. In the
tree topology we also see a reasonably good savings. However, with the line topology,
the new scheme does not make much difference(for some number of agents it is even
worse than the original). This is acceptable because first of all, the savings originally in
a line topology is already quite high and hard to beat. Secondly, due to the particular
neighbour limitation in a line topology, starting from the agent with highest interaction
cost might not necessarily result in maximum group sizes.
5.5 Summary
This chapter can be summarized in three sections. In the first section, we studied the
cost-sharing protocol. We discussed existing protocols and showed that they do not have
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all the properties we desire. We then presented our protocol in detail and proved all
the properties it carries. In the second section we described our grouping strategy. We
discussed issues and challenges we face and gave an algorithm for our grouping strat-
egy. We then analyzed the result on three different interaction topologies and proposed
improvements. In the last section, we carried out experiments that further studied how
much cost we saved using our model and what is the outcome of our grouping strategy




In this section we introduce literature that is related to our research and discuss the sim-
ilarities and differences with our model. The ideas in this thesis are related to several
concepts, including cost-sharing protocols, mechanism design and coalition formation.
We first study the related literature in the cost-sharing algorithms. Then we study the
related work in mechanism design and coalition formation. We introduce the application
area that motivated our research, sensor networks at the end of the chapter [7, 29, 22].
6.1 Cost-Sharing Strategies
One area closely related to the work presented in this thesis is cost-sharing. There are
many different algorithms and protocols for cost-sharing in the literature, but they can
be broadly classified into two groups. The first approach focuses on trying to achieve
both strategy-proofness and budget-balance properties, while the second approach tries
to achieve both strategy-proofness and efficiency. Unfortunately, it has been shown that
there is no strategyproof mechanism that is both budget-balanced and efficient [9].
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One of the simplest cost-sharing schemes that is in the group focusing on both
strategy-proofness and budget-balance is the Shapley Value cost-sharing. The Shapley
Value cost-sharing refers to a cost-sharing algorithm where each agent pays an equal
share of some fixed cost. This rule states that given some fixed cost C and n agents
in the group, every agent pays an equal share of C
n
. It is incentive compatible since an
agent’s cost does not depend on its own cost, thus manipulating its own cost will not
result in any changes in its charged amount in a group. Also this algorithm is budget-
balanced (as we can see, C
n
× n = C, which is the total cost to be covered). However,
this algorithm is not efficient, since no matter what agents’ original cost are, they always
pay the same amount.
An algorithm that represents the group focusing on both strategy-proofness and effi-
ciency is the Marginal Cost-sharing protocol. Marginal Cost-sharing is in the group of
VCG mechanisms. The Marginal Cost-sharing algoritm charges each agent an amount
depending on the marginal cost of the agent. Given an agent i in a group of agents S,
the mechanism charges this agent C(S)− C(S − i), i.e. the marginal cost for this agent
when it joined the coalition. Since it is a variation of the VCG mechanism, this algo-
rithm is strategyproof and efficient. However, just like other VCG mechanisms, it is not
group-strategyproof, nor is it budget-balanced [20].
There are lots of cost-sharing algorithm that modify and improve on these algorithms
(for example, [21, 2]). One of the most famous cost-sharing algorithms was developed
by Moulin and Shenker [21], where a fixed group of agents share a single input and single
output technology with decreasing returns (the detailed algorithm has been discussed in
Chapter Four). This algorithm is budget-balanced and fair meaning an agent with higher
demand pays more of the cost. In this algorithm, the cost share depends anonymously
upon demands and an agent’s cost share is independent of demands higher than its own.
The Moulin-Shenker algorithm is nice in several ways. It is anonymous (the names of
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the agents do not matter), monotonic (an agent’s share increases as it demands more out-
put), and the result of the protocol gives a unique Nash Equilibrium, thus following this
protocol is the dominant strategy for agents. However, there are significant differences
in their settings from ours. The Moulin-Shenker algorithm assumes the quality cannot
be manipulated. However in our case our agents may deliberately manipulate declared
cost in order to make more profit. Moulin also looked at cost-sharing from a strateyproof
and efficiency point of view with indivisible units of output [19]. Each agent may only
consume either one or zero unit and there is a specific ordering for agents to make pay-
ments. It is a variation of the Marginal-cost sharing algorithm (e.g. agent one pays C(Q1)
and agent two pays C(Q1 + Q2)− C(Q1)), with a goal of prioritizing budget-balancing
over efficiency. However, the mechanism only guarantees approximate budget-balance,
and recent studies show that for some fundamental cost-sharing problems, the algorithm
suffers poor budget-balance [23, 18].
The study of cost-sharing also appears in network domains [5, 1, 2]. Roughgarden
et al. proposed a budget-balanced and group-strategyproof algorithm for Steiner forest
cost-sharing problems [5]. A Steiner forest consists of an undirected graph G = (V, E),
non-negative costs Ce for all the edges e ∈ E, and a set R ⊆ V × V of k terminal
pairs. Each terminal pair (s, t) ∈ R is associated with an agent who wishes to establish
a connection between nodes s and t. A feasible solution is a forest F that contains a
s, t-path for each connection request (s, t) ∈ R. They use an auction-based approach.
Given a set of agents who are potential customers of a service provider, each agent has a
utility function associated with the service and each agent makes a bid to submit to the
service. The service then runs an auction to determine which agents get the service and
how much they should pay for the service. Given a set of N agents and a cost-sharing
method c, the algorithm works as follows:
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1. Step 1: create a set of agents Q = N
2. Step 2: for each agent i ∈ Q, check if the cost share c(i) is less or equal to its bid
bi.
• If true, terminate
• Otherwise, remove all agent i ∈ Q with c(i) > bi, go back to Step 1
They showed that this algorithm is strategyproof but only approximately budget-
balanced. In our model, incentive-compatibility and budget-balance are equally impor-
tant; we need a protocol that can achieve both.
Feigenbaum et al studied multi-cast cost sharing [2]. Multicast routing is a technique
for transmitting a packet from a single source to multiple receivers without wasting net-
work bandwidth. The routing is solved by constructing a directed tree and sending only
one copy of the packet over each link of a directed tree. When a packet reaches a branch
point of a tree, it is then duplicated and a copy is sent to each link below. The study of
multicast cost-sharing is to come up with an algorithm that handles the cost incurred dur-
ing this transmitting stage. Their work extends the previous result on the Shapley Value
(by dividing the cost of each link l equally among all members that are downstream to it)
and Marginal Cost (selects the receiver set that maximizes total net worth, and charges
each receiver its reported utility minus a ”bonus” equal to the marginal value it added
to the system) approaches. They focus on the computational complexity of the algo-
rithm and come up with a group strategy-proof algorithm which can be computed with
exponentially lower worst-case communication than the Shapley Value. They also char-
acterized groups that can strategize successfully against the Marginal Cost mechanism.
However, their algorithm may not achieve complete budget-balance.
Although achieving budget-balance is a general goal in most cost-sharing applica-
tions, there are also applications who assume a monopoly network operator and work on
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algorithms that maximizes revenue [8]. We will not elaborate on these works here since
they are the opposite of what we want to achieve in our thesis.
6.2 Mechanism Design and Coalition Formation
The ideas in this thesis are related to concepts from both mechanism design and coalition
formation. Coalition formation has been a well-studied area of multiagent systems and
ecommerce (see, for example Shehory and Kraus [27] and Sandholm et al. [24]). For
the most part, this work has not focused on the interaction overhead of agents nor does it
assume that agents are forming groups or coalitions to reduce their interaction costs with
some central mechanism, whereas we explicitly include these features in our model.
Forming coalition serves as a way for multi-agent cooperation. A coalition can be
formed for different purposes. For the most intuitive part, agents may form coalitions
to perform tasks that they are unable to perform otherwise. With respect to this, sev-
eral studies have provided algorithms for forming agent coalitions [27, 12, 32]. This
work usually focuses on task oriented domains where agents need to form coalitions to
perform a specific task. Zlotkin and Rosenschein study this problem on self-interested
agents [32]. While they study self-interested agents, they restrict themselves to super-
additive environments (where one’s utility is strictly increasing) and so are able to achieve
an efficient algorithm for coalition formation for this specific environment. In general,
the algorithms for coalition-formation in task-oriented domains have a different goal than
our work since they are focused on how agents would coordinate in order to perform a
specific task. The agents are essentially cooperative rather than self-interested. In our
self-interested setting, agents only form coalitions if there is a benefit for themselves.
91
6.2.1 Coalition Formation in Electronic-Marketplace
The work that most closely related to ours studies how groups of agents can form in order
to derive deals and discounts from auctions in electronic-marketplace. This particular
problem has received excessive attention [16, 15, 30, 25, 26].
Yamamoto and Sycara [30] studied the problem with a goal of reducing computa-
tional complexity for very large scale of buyers (e.g, thousands of buyers). They studied
the problem of forming buyer coalitions to enlarge total quantity of goods purchased in
each transaction, so each buyer can obtain a lower price without buying more than its
original demand. They used a reversed combinatorial auction approach (which is called
a GroupBuyAuction). A GroupBuyAuction is formed based on the category of items. For
example, a buyer may want to buy either TV A for 300 dollars or lower, or TV B for 400
dollars or higher. It is a form of reverse auction where sellers make bids with volume
discount prices (for example, a TV A for 250 dollars if more than 5 are sold, 300 dol-
lars otherwise) and buyers pool their demand to maximize their power. A mechanism is
assigned to each group to manage the auction on behalf of the buyers. When an auction
closes, the mechanism splits the buyers into subgroups consisting of buyers preferring
the same items and also selects the winning seller for this coalition, and at last, calculates
the price for each buyer. Buyers wanting the same item may pay differently depending on
their original reservation price. They give an efficient algorithm for coalition formation
and payoff division for the case where each buyer wants an XOR of items in the same
category . A suboptimal coalition (a coalition in each category) is chosen by choosing in
each round a coalition with maximum value among all optimal ones, which are formed
for each item by the buyers who have not been picked to be in the coalition.
Li et al. extended Yamamoto’s idea and studied the mechanism design problem of
coalition formation and cost sharing in an electronic marketplace [16, 15]. They stud-
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ied the problem combining coalition formation and combinatorial auction and used a
regular auction scheme instead of a reverse auction. They tackled the problem from a
core-stability perspective and their work is the first work that studies both stability and
incentive compatibility of an economy with incomplete information. They also chose
several cost-sharing algorithms (e.g. equal cost-sharing, Clarke’s mechanism) to test the
average efficiency loss. Their goal is quite different from ours. They focus on volume
discounts, i.e. the seller gives a discount when higher volumes are purchased. This re-
quires the quantity of each item in the combinatorial auction to be more than one and
buyers who want same items to group together in order to take advantage of the price
discounts. In our model, we study the problem of saving interaction cost. Our model
can be applied to, but is not limited to combinatorial auctions. Furthermore, Li’s and
Yamamoto’s idea does not take cost into account when forming coalitions. As a result,
the grand coalition will always be formed since the more agents in the coalition, the
better discount rate they are getting. In our model agents cannot always form the grand
coalition due to cost involved.
Sarne and Kraus also studied a similar problem where buyers form coalitions to take
advantage of discounts [25]. In addition, they introduced a new element: costly envi-
ronment, which is similar to our model. They assume that agents’ search for coalition
opportunities is costly, at each stage of a search an agent has to spend resources in locat-
ing and interacting with another agent. Thus, each agent, when entering the marketplace,
must consider if it is going to execute its task immediately or if it is more beneficial to
engage in costly search to extend the coalition. If an agent decides to engage in such a
search, at each stage it must decide whether to terminate the process or not. Forming the
grand coalition is not applicable anymore due to the cost introduced during formation.
They then explore agent’s optimal strategies in the equilibrium in this situation. The dif-
ference with our model is that the cost during coalition formation is known and cannot be
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manipulated. While there are similarities between these works and ours, the motivation
is different as their focus is on forming coalitions to take advantage of volume-based dis-
counts in e-marketplaces, whereas we study a more general problem domain, and focus
on ways of reducing the overall interaction cost for agents in the system.
Kraus et al described distributed coalition formation schemes for multi-agent systems
mainly focusing on increasing the group’s total utility in [26]. They study the case where
a single agent cannot perform goals by itself or is inefficient to do so. Furthermore,
being in just one coalition may also lead to a waste of resources. Thus they propose
algorithms that allow agents to form overlapping coalitions where goals have precedence
order. They use a greedy-approach to handle the coalition formation stage. However it
requires a pre-calculation of all the permutations of coalitions including up to k agents for
each agent, which has a computational complexity of O(nk). Thus the highest coalition
size is limited which means the algorithm is not suitable for large-scale systems.
In another work, Kraus, Shehory and Taase studied the problem of coalition forma-
tion with agents with incomplete information under time constraints [13]. In terms of
coalition formation, they propose a ranking strategy where each agent ranks the possible
coalitions and computes the revenue distribution for the top coalition. It then offers this
coalition to others, and accepts only proposals in which its net benefit is at least as high
as its net benefit from its computed coalition. In particular, they proposed a compromise
strategy for revenue distribution where agents compromise and agree with a payoff lower
than their estimated share and showed that under time constraint this strategy is stable
and increases social welfare compared to non-compromise schemes. Their focus is on
stability and computation complexity while we focus on maximizing social-welfare.
All the work mentioned above study a particular domain of the coalition formation
problem. We, on the other hand, look at the problem in a more general setting. Our model
is generic and can be applied to all the areas discussed above. The two applications
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we chose to discuss in the paper can be generalized and represent a wide variety of
application areas.
6.2.2 Coalition Formation from Other Perspectives
The work mentioned in the previous section are all from an e-commerce perspective.
There are also a lot of game-theoretic work that study coalition formation from other
perspectives.
Ketchpel [11] proposed a coalition-formation algorithm that handles coalition gener-
ation and payoff distribution simultaneously. The resulting coalitions are groups of size
two where one agent acts as the manager of the group and the other agent gets paid a
fixed amount. They propose a Two Agent Auction scheme that solves the payoff division
problem (i.e. how to choose the manager of the group). However, this process can be
very complex and thus inefficient. His algorithm does not consider incentives so it cannot
be used on self-interested agents.
Zlotkin et al [32] analyze payoff division in subadditive task oriented domains. Their
algorithm guarantees each agent an expected value equal to the Shapley value. They
achieved it by only linear complexity in the number of agents, as opposed to exponential
complexity for a naive implementation of the Shapley value. Shapley value does not
usually guarantee stability in each group, however, in the setting of a subadditive do-
main as they study, the solution does guarantee that the group of agents will stay in the
same coalition structure. Furthermore, in their work, the agents always form the grand
coalition, which is very different from our model.
Yokoo et al [31] have looked at the existing solution concepts and pointed out that
the existing concepts have limitations when applied to open, anonymous environments
such as the Internet. In such environments, an agent may hide its identity and pretend
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to be multiple agents, or a group of agents can collude and pretend to be a single agent.
These manipulations can be very hard to detect. Having identified the issues, Yokoo et al
have developed a new solution concept called the anonymity-proof core, which is robust
against these manipulations.
There is also work that analyze the optimization within each coalition and the com-
putational complexity. Contizer and Sandholm [6] looked at the coalition formation
problem from a computational-complexity perspective. They studied the set of superad-
ditive games and provided an efficient method for checking whether a given outcome is
in the core. They also showed, however, checking whether the core is nonempty is in
fact NP-hard due to the difficulty in determining the collaborative possibilities (the set of
outcome possibly for the grand coalition).
Sandholm et al. [24] have studied a worst-case bound on the quality of coalition
structure while only searching a small fraction of the coalition structures. This is impor-
tant since searching the optimal coalition structure is an NP-Complete problem. They
provided an algorithm that established a tight bound within the minimum amount of
search.
6.3 Coordination in Sensor Networks
The motivating application of our research was sensor networks [14]. A sensor network
is a network consisting of spatially distributed autonomous devices using sensors to co-
operatively monitor physical or environmental conditions, such as temperature, sound,
vibration, pressure, motion or pollutants, at different locations.
Dang et al. proposed coalition formation algorithms for sensor network applications
with overlapping coalitions [7]. They proposed two algorithms to find the optimal coali-
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tion for sensors. Their first algorithm is a polynomial time approximation algorithm
that uses a greedy approach. Their second algorithm is based on a branch-and-bound
technique (i.e. search through the search space in a depth-first manner). One major con-
tribution of their paper is considering the situation of overlapping coalitions. However
their work is quite different from ours as in the sensors in their setting are cooperative
and one of their limitations is that the environment is static as opposed to dynamically
changing values.
In another paper, Soh et al. investigated negotiation strategies for forming coalitions
to track moving objects [29]. Their focus is on forming dynamic coalitions for tracking
targets in a noisy and uncertain environment. Agents have incomplete information and
need to respond in real-time. Thus their focus is on improving the quality of coalition
formation process and the quality of coalition in terms of target-tracking. In their algo-
rithm, agents carry out a one-to-one negotiation to its neighbours based on a negotiation
protocol. Their goal is for agents to form a satisfying coalition in a timely manner.
Rogers et al. [22] looked at information fusion within a bandwidth-limited multi-
sensor network. They consider sensors to be self-interested rational agents who work to
maximize their own utility. They defined a valuation function based on Kalman filters.
Then they extended the generalized VCG mechanism to deal with the valuation functions
and proved their mechanism is incentive compatible and individually rational. In this pa-
per, the sensors have incomplete views of the world and need to communicate with other
sensors to get a full view of the world and gain utility from it. However the bandwidth
is limited so sensors have to decide which neighbour to contact for information. This
setting is quite different from ours as in that the agents in our scenario do not care about
the overall information. One most important difference is that most literature in sensor
networks considers cooperative agents, i.e. agents working together with the same goal
in mind. We, on the other hand, are more interested in self-interested agents. Although
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the sensor network application motivated our research, there are quite a few differences
with respect to the model we would like to study and furthermore, we would want to
expand our model to a more general domain.
6.4 Summary
In this chapter, we provided an overview of literature in the area of mechanism design,
cost-sharing and coalition formation. Our work in this thesis is different from most
of the work mentioned above. None of the work on cost-sharing achieves incentive-
compatibility, budget-balance and fairness together as we desire. Thus we developed our
own cost-sharing protocol which is budget-balanced, prevents agents from manipulating
the cost and is also fair. The literature on sensor-networks is a motivation for our model.
However, most applications in this area assumes agents are cooperative rather than dif-
ferent stake-holders with a goal of maximizing their own utility. Moreover, our model
is not limited to the network-scenario; it covers a wider range of applications. The work
that is closest to our research is the work on mechanism design for volume discounts in
e-commerce. In this work agents are self-interested and will form coalitions in order to
get a lower discounted price. Some literature studied the set of super-additive games,
and in these settings agents will always form the grand coalition thus the only question
is how to divide payments. In other work, agents incur a cost during the coalition for-
mation stage thus the grand coalition is not always feasible, which is closer to our work.
However our goal is different from theirs. They focus on achieving volume discounts
(meaning the auction is on a single type of item) while we focus on lowering the inter-
action cost incurred when communicating to the center, and our work can be applied in




In this thesis we looked at the problem of coalition formation with self-interested agents
in order to reduce total interaction cost. We studied a problem where agents are limited
in their interactions with a central mechanism by cost, but have the possibility of coordi-
nating with other agents in the system in order to share and reduce these costs. Our goal
was to design a model which allows agents to form stable groups to avoid the overhead
of each agent interacting independently with the mechanism, and at the same time still
promoting truth-telling and ensuring individual rationality throughout the model.
In this chapter, we summarize the contributions of this thesis. We also describe some
directions for future work.
7.1 Contributions
The main contributions of this thesis were:
• A model of costly interaction
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• Core-stable and fair payoff algorithms for reward-distribution
• Novel cost-sharing protocol
• Analysis on different interaction topologies
7.1.1 A Model of Costly Interaction
We presented a model for self-interested agents to form groups with neighbours in order
to reduce total interaction cost. We gave motivating examples that can be applied using
our model and discussed issues and difficulties we are facing in Chapter Three. In par-
ticular, our model consists of a reward-distribution and a cost-sharing algorithm which
were studied separately in Chapter Four and Five.
7.1.2 Core-stable and Fair Payoff Algorithms for Reward-Distribution
We analyzed the reward-distribution mechanisms in Chapter Four. We made the as-
sumption in the information-provision setting that information can be discretized into
areas and proposed a redistribution algorithm to handle the excess amount collected
by the VCG mechanism. We then observed the inefficiency issue in the combinato-
rial auction setting when using a regular VCG mechanism. Thus we modified the group
bid to be a permutation of XORs of all the possible bids and looked at the issue from
a coalitional games perspective. The major contributions in this chapter are the two
reward-distribution mechanisms we proposed which features core-stability and fairness.
The core-stability payoff solution features a payoff vector proportional to each agent’s
original valuation. As a result, the outcome is unique and core-stable. The fair payoff
mechanism used a different valuation function and was fair. However when the core is
non-empty using this mechanism, it is not necessarily unique. Then we showed that it
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is not possible to guarantee both core-stability and fairness in our model. Finally, we
carried out experiments to test the effect on agents’ payoff using two different reward-
distribution schemes.
7.1.3 Cost-Sharing Protocol
We presented our cost-sharing protocol and group formation strategy in Chapter Five.
Our cost-sharing protocol features three properties: incentive-compatibility, cost-recovery
and fairness. The incentive-compatibility is crucial in our protocol because we are work-
ing with self-interested agents, and the interaction cost from an agent to center is known
privately to the agent itself and thus may be manipulated. Our protocol also satisfies a
cost-recovery property meaning that we are not collecting extra money from the agents.
The final property we had is fairness. We proposed that the cost agents pay inside groups
should reflect the benefit they receive. The more benefit they receive, the higher amount
they should pay.
7.1.4 Analysis on Different Interaction Topologies
We proposed a greedy-based grouping strategy for group formation and we observed
that our final outcome depends on the agents’ interaction topology and analyzed differ-
ent topologies. We analyzed the total savings in interaction cost using three different
interaction topologies: line, star and tree. We discovered that the outcome is different
because of the different layouts of topologies. We then proposed a heuristic for group for-
mation which takes different topology patterns into consideration. Experiments showed
that the heuristic worked better than the original grouping strategy.
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7.2 Directions for Future Work
In this section we outline some direction for future work that arise from this thesis.
7.2.1 Stability and Fairness: The Impossibility Result
In Chapter Four we proposed two reward-distribution mechanisms which features core-
stability and fairness respectively. Unfortunately, we showed that there is no guarantee
that we can achieve both these properties together.
This observation leads to two directions. First, we would like to study further into
the valuation functions and the mechanisms we used for reward-distribution to see if a
core-stable and fair algorithm is attainable. This would possibly involve in modifying
the mechanism (the VCG mechanism) that we are currently using.
The second direction is studying the tradeoffs between core-stability and fairness. We
have conducted preliminary experiments which give us a general idea about the effect of
the two mechanisms. However, experiments on larger groups of agents might provide
additional insight as in what kind of agents benefit more in which algorithm.
7.2.2 Fair Cost-Sharing Protocol
We proposed an incentive-compatible, cost-recovery and fair cost-sharing protocol in
Chapter Five. Some future work on this area is to further study the definition of fairness.
Our current definition requires that an agent with higher benefit is not paying less then
an agent with lower benefit. We would like to extend this definition so that an agent with
higher benefit is always paying a higher cost, to best reflect real-world situations. We
would also like to see if we can modify our cost-sharing algorithm so that the extended
degree of fairness can be reached.
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7.2.3 Grouping Mechanism and Topology Dependency
We observed in Chapter Five that our grouping mechanism is topology dependent. Our
heuristic mechanism goes one step further and takes some advantage of different topolo-
gies. However, more can be done in this area. For example, we would like to take
a further look at possible extensions to our mechanism to take advantage of different
topologies. We would like to investigate whether a topology-independent grouping strat-
egy is feasible. We would also like to look at combined, more complicated interaction
topologies and conduct further experiments.
7.3 Summary
In this thesis we studied a problem where self-interested agents need to interact with
some centralized mechanism where this interaction is costly. We provided a model
to allow self-interested agents to form groups in order to save on the total interaction
cost. We proposed two different reward-distribution algorithms based on different ap-
plications. We analyzed the reward-distribution mechanism from a coalitional games
perspective and proposed two solutions featuring core-stability and fairness. We then
proposed a novel cost-sharing algorithm which is incentive-compatible, cost-recovery
and fair. We provided algorithms for group formation techniques and studied the effect
of this technique on different interaction topologies. In the end we conducted prelimi-
nary experiments that validate our model. Our reward-distribution algorithm applies to
any application that can fall into the two generalized category generalized from infor-
mation provision network and combinatorial auction setting. Moreover, our cost-sharing
algorithm and grouping strategy are generic so they can be applied to any applications.
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